Daily Report

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FBIS-EEU-92-059 *26 March 1992*

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International Affairs

A CSCE foreign ministers meeting in Helsinki on 24 March voted to formally admit Croatia as a full CSCE member, Zagreb radio reports. The session also decided to send a delegation to Nagorno-Karabakh to "search for a peaceful settlement of disputes" in the predominantly Armenian-populated enclave of Azerbaijan, according to CSTK. In addition, it is planned to convene an international conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under CSCE auspices. CSFR Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier, in an address to the conference, said efforts to resolve the conflict demonstrate to what degree the "East and West can transform past tension into effective democratic cooperation." "The most tragic thing" Dienstbier pointed out, "would be if the iron curtain were to be shifted a bit farther to the East... or if a (division) were to exist between democratic and prosperous countries and countries where destitution rules" in "dictatorial regimes."

Yugoslavia

Bosnia-Hercegovina—The Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency issued a statement demanding that the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) withdraw from the municipality of Bosanski Brod, TANJUG reports. The withdrawal should be "implemented urgently" by 26 March. If the withdrawal of "said opposing forces" does not take place by the deadline, the Presidency will "inform the UN Security Council and the world public that there has been an outbreak of internal aggression on the territory." Sarajevo radio reports that the JNA contends that reports of JNA forces "being directly involved in the fighting in Bosanski Brod" are "all fabrications" and that the JNA "did not even hurt a fly last night."

Hungary

The National Assembly authorized the government "to abrogate" the 1977 CSFR-Hungarian Gabikovo-Nagymaros dam project if Czechoslovakia "fails to stop work" on the project and continues "violating the agreement," MTI reports. According to Minister Without Portfolio Ferenc Madl, the National Assembly "has reached a turning point" on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam issue, Budapest radio reports. The resolution adopted states that Czechoslovakia is "unilaterally" going ahead with the construction of a dam "which means diverting the Danube," and this is unacceptable to the Hungarian Government. The resolution asks Czechoslovakia to accept the "trilateral study" involving EC experts, which points out the ecological problems related to the dam and "agree on a bilateral intergovernmental decision." According to Madl, the "hard core of the decision" provides that if the CSFR rejects Hungary's proposal, Hungary "will have no option but to unilaterally abrogate the 1977 dam treaty."

Albania

The Albanian author Ismail Kadare, who is "credited with having helped spur the democratization process in his country" by seeking political asylum in France in 1990, said that he will not pursue an "active political role" when he returns home, AFP reports. Kadare is not sure when he will return to Albania due to "some superficial administrative factors."

CSCE Foreign Ministers Hold Session in Helsinki

Croatia Accepted as Member

LD2403134992 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] At the Helsinki CSCE meeting, CSCE foreign ministers have formally admitted Croatia as a full member. Croatian Deputy Prime Minister Mate Granic signed the document and was officially introduced to the conference chairman, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier. The Croatian delegation has had talks with several foreign ministers. The talks focused on the arrival of peacekeeping forces in Croatia and international assistance for a Croatia devastated by the war. The Finnish president will receive Mate Granic and Zdravko Skrabalo this evening, Croatian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Ante Babic revealed today.

Dienstbier To Head NKAO Delegation

LD2403234192 Prague CSTK in English 1221 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Helsinki March 24 (CSTK)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier will lead a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) peaceful mission to Nagorno-Karabakh [NKAO], the CSCE Council of Ministers confirmed here today. The delegation is scheduled to leave Prague for the disputed, mostly Armenian-populated enclave in Azerbaijan, on March 30 and to return on April 3. It will also include representatives of Germany and Sweden, Ivan Busniak, member of the Czechoslovak delegation at the current CSCE follow-up meeting, told CSTK. Busniak said that "for Czechoslovakia this means constant integration in the search for a peaceful settlement of disputes, not only in Nagorno-Karabakh". Jiri Dienstbier has been presiding [over] the CSCE Council of Ministers since January 1992.

CSCE Conference on NKAO To Be Convened

LD2503210192 Prague CSTK in English 1255 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Helsinki March 25 (CSTK correspondent)—Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier today said the convocation of an international conference on Nagorno-Karabakh [NKAO] under the aegis of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) is a historical breakthrough in the Helsinki process. A decision to convene the CSCE conference on the troubled predominantly-Armenian enclave in Azerbaijan was made at the 4th CSCE follow-up meeting here on Tuesday. The conference will be held in Minsk, capital of Belarus, on a date to be still determined.

On March 30, Dienstbier, who has been presiding [over] the CSCE Ministers' Council since January, will leave for Nagorno-Karabakh at the head of a CSCE peaceful mission, scheduled to return April 3. Addressing the CSCE conference today, Dienstbier said European diplomacy must assert the principle of "integration of integrations" and combine effort by the CSCE, NATO, the Western European Union, the European Community and the Council of Europe. Dienstbier said the CSCE must be quick and effective in its work and must prefer partnership to rivalry.

Reacting to the Tuesday accident at the nuclear power plant at St. Petersburg, Dienstbier said "financial and technical means must be combined for nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe to attain West European safety levels".

Dienstbier also said today that efforts to resolve the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh will show how well the countries of East and West can transform past tension into effective democratic cooperation. "We cannot allow the world to be divided again", Dienstbier told CSTK during the fourth meeting of CSCE ministers. "The most tragic thing would be if the iron curtain were to be shifted a bit farther to the East...or if a (division) were to exist between democratic and prosperous countries and countries where destitution rules and there are various types of authoritarian or dictatorial regimes".

Dienstbier also said today he had been told by Croatian Deputy Premier Mate Granic that the Adria pipeline, which supplies Czechoslovakia with oil, was out of order, but not seriously damaged by fighting in Croatia.

The pipeline, which runs between the Yugoslav Adriatic coast, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, is important for ensuring oil deliveries to Czechoslovakia in addition to those from the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Czechoslovakia is planning to receive via the pipeline oil deliveries from Nigeria as a result of a Czechoslovak-Nigerian trade agreement signed last year. Czechoslovakia recognised Croatian and Slovenian independence on January 16, but has not yet established formal diplomatic relations with either one.

Dienstbier also spoke with the Foreign Ministers of Austria, Canada, Finland concerning which countries should be represented in a CSCE observer mission slated to leave for Nagorno-Karabakh on March 30.

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After returning to Prague from Helsinki, Dienstbier told journalists that the significance of the CSCE mission to Nagorno-Karabakh will depend on the willingness of all sides to understand that the conflict cannot be resolved through military action. He said this willingness could be demonstrated by a committment to honour the current cease-fire. The CSCE mission will be creating the conditions necessary for permanent peacekeeping forces to be sent to the region according to Dienstbier, though the mission's departure on March 30 was still subject to confirmation.

Socialist Party's Nano Discusses Election Results

AU2503174592 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1100 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Sokol Terihati report]

[Text] Socialist Party [PSSh] Chairman Fatos Nano held a news conference at the Palace of Congresses' news center at 0900 GMT this morning. Local and foreign reporters who had come to monitor the 22 March elections and representatives of the diplomatic corps accredited in Tirana attended.

Nano said first that we reconfirm our acceptance of the 22 March election results, which show the people's will. We announced that we would do this before the elections, and we will keep our word now that they are over. The PSSh is of the opinion that even in Albania the electorate was influenced by the present European trend toward the political right. Nevertheless, we express our regret that these elections could not manage to set a necessary equilibrium among the parliamentary forces, which would be useful to overcome the present difficulties.

He later said: We claim there were some irregularities during the electoral campaign and on 22 March, but they do not alter the final result. There were cases of physical and psychological terror against the PSSh's parliamentary candidates, members, and supporters during the campaign. We remain a party of the European left, and our presence in the opposition will help us as a party, too.

In conclusion, Nano said that he wishes the Democratic Party good luck in solving the problems that lie ahead. We will support them in parliament on reconstructing the economy and agriculture and drafting a modern European legislation that will encourage the foreign investments so necessary for Albania now. We consider 22 March to be the end of one period and the beginning of another for Albania on its road toward democratic Europe. He then answered reporters' questions.

Puke Celebrates Democratic Party Victory

AU2503194092 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1430 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Rrok Nelcaj report]

[Text] As the news media have reported, the Democratic Party [PD] candidates Marash Ibraj and Simon Puta won in both Puke District constituencies. The PD branch for Fushe Arrez held a peaceful rally today to greet this victory of democracy.

Highlanders from the most remote villages of the areas of Iballe, Mertur, Berishe, Apripe, and Gjegjan freed forever from the heavy yoke of dictatorship, greeted each other like brothers with the heartfelt words: Long live democracy. Miners, copper processors, geologists, and peasants have come to attend this rally. Though they poured their sweat and pain into the galleries of the mines, the mineshafts, and the remote forestry areas, poverty and spiritual sorrow aged them before their time. Today they feel young and happy as never before. Their suppressed desires and willpower have burst forth fearlessly and freely. Confidence and great hope are assuaging their grief.

PD Branch Chairman Lec Hajdari said in his welcoming speech that 22 March is the day when the people of Puke emerged into daylight and abandoned the darkness of the grim communist night once and for all by voting for democracy. Embarking on the road toward democracy, the people of Puke left the class struggle behind to advance toward brotherliness, love, and understanding for each other. The young people and pupils will now cease to be students of Marxist-Leninist ideology, which devastated and suppressed their youthful feelings like a black cloud and did not let them join developed Europe.

Meanwhile, all the participants in this peaceful rally cheered the PD and Sali Berisha. They held slogans reading: Democracy, stability, law.

The rally was then greeted by Zekrip Alushi, secretary of the Managing Council of the PD District Branch. He said that democracy is for everyone, and rejects class struggle and the persecution of the people. These were products of communism alone, from which the people of Puke gained nothing. There is no reason for highlanders of these areas to feel they are breaking their word by putting communism behind them. Communism betrayed the people of Puke because it promised them much and gave them nothing; even worse, it took away what belonged to them.

Pashke Leka, chairman of the Social Democratic Party's District Branch, representatives of the Political Prisoners' Association, a group of intellectuals, and several young people also greeted the rally. The district's candidates Marash Ibraj and Simon Puta spoke last. Speaking of Fushe Arrez as the first cradle of democracy, they promised all its inhabitants that they will justify their confidence with fruitful work.

Writer Kadare To Forego Politics Upon Return

AU2503152092 Paris AFP in English 1454 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Paris, March 25 (AFP) - Albanian author Ismail Kadare, whose escape to France 18 months ago is credited with having helped spur the democratization process in his country, said Wednesday [25 March] that he did not seek an active political role when he returns home. Kadare, whose best-known work, "General of the Dead Army", was made into a successful film in Europe, is a very popular figure in Albania where he was for many years president of the Writers' Union.

The writer, who earlier this week announced plans to return home after the defeat of the former Communist Party in elections there Sunday [22 March], said he hoped to share his time between Albania and France, where the Fayard publishing house holds the world rights to his works. He said he did not know exactly when he would return, because "although I am already there in spirit, some superficial administrative factors are delaying my return."

Albania's democratic experiment is not, however, a source of literary inspiration, Kadare said in an interview here. "My next novel will be about the pyramid of Cheops, in Egypt," he said.

Socialist Party Candidates for People's Assembly

92P20198A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 8 Mar 92 p 1

[Socialist Party Candidates for People's Assembly Deputies, by Constituencies]

[Text] BERAT
1. Miltjadh Loni Miti, 53, mechanical engineer
2. Hektor Fejzo Cane, 35, KSh [master of sciences]. geological engineering
3. Fatos Thanas Nano, 40, BVS [senior scientific collaborator], political economy
4. Xhemal Iljaz Dauti, 43, agronomist
5. Tofik Elmaz Ajazi, 43, physician

DIBER
6. Sefedin Ali Shabani, 39, geological engineer
7. Kujtim Mexhit Osmani, 40, lawyer
8. Fehmi Azis Abdiu, 48, KSh, lawyer
9. Shkelqim Islam Cani, 36, KSh, faculty of economics

DURRES
10. Kujtim Qemal Kumbaro, 42, electrical engineer
11. Bardhyl Hasan Agasi. 43, languages and literature
12. Flamur Shqyri Hidri, 46, faculty of economics
13. Ibrahim Sali Baci, 46, agronomist
14. Miri Ahmet Hoti, 50, physician

ELBASAN
15. Bukurosh Ndricim Stafa, 41, DSh [doctor of sciences], metallurgical engineering
16. Moikom Zihni Zeqo, 46, languages and literature
17. Kozma Hipokrat Biba, 48, chemist
18. Tomorr Fadil Peza, 41, journalist
19. Ndricim Qamil Hysa, 33, agronomist
20. Agron Dilaver Tato, 43, KSh, mathematics
21. Dritan Bexhet Cerma, 37, journalist

FIER
22. Xhevat Reshit Lloshi, 54, KSh, languages and literature
23. Nikollaq Jorgji Koshovari, 46, physician
24. Xhorxhi Llambri Marku, 44, mechanical engineer
25. Mehmet Brahush Bogdani, 53, agronomist
26. Ilia Theodhori Nika, 36, mathematician
27. Bardhyl Neki Fasko, 40, agronomist
28. Kastriot Selam Islami, 40, DSh, physics
29. Ylli Sokrat Bufi, 44, chemistry

GRAMSH
30. Bashkim Beqir Koci, 43, mechanical enginer

GJIROKASTER
31. Leontjev Skender Cuci, 42, KSh, political economy
32. Theodhori Apostol Bej, 52, economics docent

KAVAJE
33. Grigor Spiro Qerfuzi, 35, physical culture
34. Artan Xhevit Arupi, 23, student
35. Ejup Isuf Tabaku, 38, economics

KOLONJE
36. Sotir Misto Kokeri, 38, philosopher

KORCE
37. Rexhep Saliko Cuko, 42, KSh, mathematics
38. Leonard Mihallaq Tilka, 38, faculty of economics
39. Janaq Kristaq Katundi, 38, languages and literature
40. Alfred Llazar Trebicka, 26, film director
41. Koco Thoma Broka, 40, political economy
42. Servet Ismail Pellumbi, 56, DSh, philosopher
43. Lutfi Halim Dautllari, 43, agronomist

KRUJE
44. Mehmet Hasan Loci, 46, agronomist
45. Gjergj Bardhok Gjoci, 38, animal husbandry specialist
46. Suzana Llambi Dhimuli, 40, journalist

KUKES
47. Shaqir Sadik Shehu, 40, physician
48. Namik Hamza Dokle, 46, faculty of economics
49. Mehmet Hasan Karakushi, 48, languages and literature

LEZHE
50. Marash Ndoka (Marku), 48, KSh, history and geography
51. Adem Sadik Zyberi, 50, official

LIBRAZHD
52. Qemal Veli Alla, 42, economist
53. Fatos Shahin Zhari, 41, history and geography

LUSHNJE
54. Bujar Hekuran Kuka, 48, physician
55. Artan Sokrat Gjermeni, 25, lawyer
56. Thanas Jorgji Rrudha, 56, agronomist
57. Vladimir Perikli Metani, 42, lawyer

MAT
58. Halil Ahmet Lalaj, 45, languages and literature
59. Hamdi Hasan Beshku, 39, geological engineer

MIRDITE
60. Bardhok Pjeter Prenga, 38, geological engineer
61. Dode Pjeter Pjetraj, 39, construction engineer

PERMET
62. Ethem Bajram Kolleshi, 45, physician

POGRADEC
63. Vasfi Ali Topciu, 37, physician
64. Nefail Hamit Biba, 48, economist, docent

PUKE
65. Pashk Gjon Deda, 36, agronomist
66. Nikolle Marash Deda, 37, physician

SARANDE
67. Gramoz Kaso Ruci, 41, biology
68. Limoz Hulesi Dizdari, 50, composer, distinguished artist
69. Anastas Mihal Angjeli, 36, KSh, economist

SKRAPAR
70. Bashkim Ferat Caka, 42, lawyer
71. Ilir Rexhep Meta, 23, student

SHKODER
72. Fatmir Sel Brahimi, 39, physician
73. Medin Halil Zhega, 46, merchandising specialist
74. Artan Athanas Banushi, 28, political economy
75. Iliaz Imer Bushaj, 46, history and geography
76. Zef Nush Preci, 34, KSh, economics
77. Frederik Ndrek Reshpja, 50, journalist
78. Skender Ismail Zaimaj, 40, physician
79. Shaqir Bejto Vukaj, 50, chemist

TEPELENE
80. Ethem Novruz Ruka. 45, DSh, biologist
81. Xhafer Taip Ruci. 43, physician

TIRANA
82. Luan Mersin Rama, 26, languages and literature
83. Pandeli Sotir Majko, 25, student
84. Spartak Dilaver Poci, 43, construction engineer
85. Luan Reshat Hajdaraga, 44, psychologist, docent
86. Perparim Mustafa Xhixha, 43, journalist
87. Enver Beqir Reci, 43, mechanical engineer
88. Maqo Lefter Lakrori, 44, KSh, electrical engineer
89. Musa Rexhep Ulqini, 33, philosophy
90. Sulejman Ramazan Kuqi, 36, physician
91. Bashkim Lilo Zeneli, 44, lawyer
92. Luan Skender Shahollari, 40, economist
93. Rexhep Ramazan Cani, 50, agronomist

TROPOJE
94. Lush Martin Perpali, 39, KSh, economics

VLORE
95. Eduart Bajram Alushi, 35, economist
96. Albert Todi Minga, 46, film director, distinguished artist
97. Agim Sulo Haxhiraj, 36, construction engineer
98. Niko Qemal Veizaj, 42, physician
99. Fatmir Myrto Zanaj, 41, philosophy
100. Sabit Laze Broka, 50, physician, professor doctor

Socialist Party Candidates for Supplemental Seats

92P20199A Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 8 Mar 92 p 1

[List of Socialist Party Candidates for Supplemental Seats as Deputies in People's Assembly]

[Text]

1. Fatos Thanas Nano, [date of birth] 16 September 1952, Tirana
2. Dritero Riza Agolli, 13 October 1931, Tirana
3. Servet Ismali Pellumbi, 14 December 1936, Tirana
4. Kastriot Selman Islami, 18 August 1952, Tirana
5. Gramoz Kaso Ruci, 6 December 1951, Tepelene
6. Ermelinda Ahmet Meksi, 4 January 1956, Tirana
7. Maqo Lefter Lakrori, 23 July 1948, Tirana
8. Namik Hamza Dokle, 11 March 1946, Tirana
9. Anastas Mihai Angjeli, 6 May 1956, Tirana
10. Moikom Zihni Zeqo, 3 June 1946, Durres
11. Fehmi Azis Abdiu, 4 January 1944, Tirana
12. Sabit Laze Brokaj, 7 January 1942, Tirana
13. Shaqir Bejto Vukaj, 20 August 1942, Shkoder
14. Luan Reshat Hajdaraga, 2 August 1948, Tirana
15. Miri Ahmet Hoti, 25 May 1942, Durres
16. Xhevat Reshit Lloshi, 26 January 1938, Tirana
17. Theodhori Apostol Bej, 7 October 1940, Tirana
18. Albert Todi Minga, 4 March 1946, Tirana
19. Leontiev Skender Cuci, 25 March 1952, Tirana
20. Bashkim Lilo Zeneli, 25 August 1946, Tirana
21. Mehmet Hasan Loci, 4 February 1948, Tirana
22. Lush Martin Perpali, 8 May 1953, Tirana
23. Bardhyl Hasan Agasi, 18 October 1949, Durres
24. Ndre Zef Legisi, 28 July 1958, Tirana
25. Shelqim Ismail Cani, 5 July 1956, Tirana
26. Pandeli Sotir Majko, 15 November 1967, Tirana
27. Ethem Novruz Ruka, 8 December 1948, Tirana
28. Medin Halil Zhegaj, 7 July 1946, Tirana
29. Musa Rexhep Ulqini, 21 May 1959, Tirana
30. Ibrahim Sali Baci, 22 July 1946, Tirana
31. Ylli Sokrat Bufi, 25 May 1948, Tirana
32. Halil Ahmet Lalaj, 19 March 1947, Tirana
33. Adem Sadik Zyberi, 17 February 1942, Tirana
34. Vladimir Perikli Metani, 23 March 1950, Lushnje
35. Alfred Gjon Paloka, 22 July 1938, Tirana
36. Alfred Llazar Trebicka, 3 May 1966, Tirana
37. Luan Skender Shahollari, 1 March 1952, Tirana
38. Gezim Ilirjan Tushe, 17 January 1953, Vlore
39. Shyqyri Selajdin Meka, 1 January 1953, Tirana
40. Cun Jonuz Cunaj, 7 February 1918, Koplik
41. Sokol Hamit Sinani, 23 May 1957, Tirana
42. Din Ahmet Abazaj, 20 November 1938, Tirana
43. Kujtim Qemal Kumbaro, 2 March 1951, Durres
44. Fatri Xhevit Sinani, 7 April 1948, Tirana
45. Vasil Paskal Kureta, 2 April 1947, Tirana
46. Ilir Gani Zela, 7 August 1970, Tirana
47. Ilir Rexhep Meta, 24 March 1969, Tirana
48. Thoma Jani Gellci, 27 December 1961, Tirana
49. Hamdi Haki Jupe, 29 September 1954, Tirana
50. Bukurosh Ndricim Stafa, 26 July 1951, Elbasan
51. Nazmi Beqir Koka, 20 December 1950, Librazhd
52. Flamur Nazif Metollari, 10 November 1969, Tirana
53. Perparim Mustafa Xhixha, 7 August 1969, Tirana
54. Bardhyl Neki Fasko. 15 September 1952, Fier
55. Ejup Isuf Tabaku, 21 June 1954, Kavaje
56. Suzana Llambi Dhimuli, 8 June 1952, Lac
57. Mehmet Hasan Karakushi, 7 June 1944, Durres
58. Marash Ndok Marku, 5 October 1944, Lezhe
59. Nefail Hamit Biba, 8 November 1944, Tirana
60. Zef Nush Preci, 5 May 1958, Tirana
61. Limoz Hulesi Dizdari, 7 February 1942, Tirana
62. Frederik Ndrek Reshpja, 15 July 1942, Shkoder
63. Fatmir Myrto Zanaj, 6 October 1951, Tirana
64. Dode Pjeter Pjetri, 12 December 1953, Mirdite
65. Koco Thoma Broka, 10 May 1952, Tirana
66. Fatbardha Skender Polovina, 4 August 1954, Berat
67. Zef Kole Docaj, 11 July 1948, Puke
68. Rexhep Saliko Cuko, 9 November 1950, Tirana
69. Pellumb Haziz Vladi, 14 August 1951, Tirana
70. Mitre Pando Nedelko, 16 November 1950, Korce
71. Guri Ligor Thanasi, 30 April 1951, Kocove
72. Mehmet Brahush Bogdani, 23 October 1939, Tirana

73. Haki Shaban Morina, 17 December 1963, Tirana
74. Arben Xhemal Malaj, 19 September 1961, Vlore
75. Hektor Fejzo Cane, 21 January 1957, Tirana
76. Qemal Veli Alla, 1 January 1950, Librazhd
77. Skender Ismail Zaimaj, 11 October 1952, Shkoder
78. Sherif Servet Bundo, 15 October 1956, Tirana
79. Petro Vasil Koci, 15 February 1961, Fier
80. Dashamir Nazif Karafili, 10 September 1957, Pogradec
81. Artan Sokrat Gjermeni, 21 April 1967, Lushnje
82. Luan Mersin Rama, 9 March 1966, Tirana
83. Hasan Gani Hoxha, 25 January 1955, Tirana
84. Eduard Bajram Alushi, 16 June 1957, Vlore
85. Xhafer Taip Ruci, 14 September 1948, Tepelene
86. Bashkim Dilaver Caka, 20 June 1953, Tirana
87. Tofik Elmaz Ajazi, 27 December 1949, Berat
88. Bardhok Pjeter Prenga, 10 March 1954, Mirdite
89. Flamur Shyqyri Hidri, 26 December 1945, Durres
90. Miltiadh Loni Miti, 23 May 1939, Berat
91. Ethem Bajram Kolleshi, 12 December 1947, Permet
92. Shaqir Sadik Shehu, 20 March 1952, Kukes
93. Kozma Hipokrat Biba, 6 July 1944, Elbasan
94. Dritan Bexhet Cerma, 25 April 1955, Elbasan
95. Kujtim Mexhit Osmani, 6 September 1952, Peshkopi
96. Artan Xhevit Arapi, 25 February 1969, Tirana
97. Sotir Misto Kokeri, 15 April 1954, Kolonje
98. Janaq Kristaq Katundi, 10 September 1954, Maliq
99. Grigor Spiro Qerfozi, 12 April 1957, Tirana
100. Bashkim Beqir Koci, 1 March 1949, Gramsh

Dimitrov, Kostov Address National Assembly

AU2503163692 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] After approving its weekly legislative program, the National Assembly adopted a bill on amendments and addenda to the Labor Code at first reading at the beginning of its plenary session today. The amendments and addenda contain a statement on granting administrative leave to Bulgarian citizens who profess religions other than the Eastern Orthodox faith on holidays of their respective religions.

Before the debates on the first reading of the 1992 draft budget, Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov delivered an address on the philosophy and goals of his cabinet. The government's priorities are privatization and development of the private sector, the problem of foreign debt, social welfare and health insurance, human rights, stability in the Balkans, law and order, legality, economy, social protection, science, culture, education, national security, and foreign policy.

Following the recess, Finance Minister Ivan Kostov reported on the Council of Ministers' financial policy and on the 1992 state budget. The draft budget is expected to establish a form of state organization which should consolidate the country's financial stability, Kostov declared. He pointed out that, for the first time, a budget has been submitted to parliament whose classification and structure are in accordance with international standards, while the budget deficit has increased insignificantly compared with 1991.

On behalf of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Parliamentary Union, Zhan Videnov declared disapproval of the prime minister's declaration and of the budget. Aleksandur Yordanov, on behalf of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] parliamentary group, declared that this is a realistic draft budget for a country brought to the brink of national disaster by the BSP-communists. Emil Buchkov, on behalf of the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS], expressed support for the budget. Representatives of numerous permanent commissions submitted their remarks, evaluations, and views on the draft budget.

Parliament Passes 1992 Budget on First Reading

AU2603082692 Sofia BTA in English 2102 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Sofia, March 25 (BTA)—Bulgaria's parliament today passed the 1992 draft budget on first reading. Expected revenues amount to 44,500 million leva and requested expenditures to 53,600 million leva. The budget deficit voted is slightly over 9,000 million leva, or some 4.3 per cent of the GDP [gross domestic product]. Shortly before the vote, Finance Minister Ivan Kostov undertook to submit the draft budget to a second reading as early as next week. Summing up the debate, Mr. Kostov stressed that the opposition Socialist faction had not proposed a reasonable alternative to the budget. Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov also emphasized that "there is no alternative." Most of the Socialist MP's [member of parliament] abstained from voting and some voted against. The Movement for Rights and Freedoms supported the budget.

Most parliamentary committees had critical remarks to the draft budget but recommended that it pass on first reading. No consensus had been reached in a number of committees. The chairman of the Economic Committee Mr. Asen Michkovski recommended that the finance minister reconsider the structure of deficit financing. The MP's who took the floor in the debate said that the planned spending on defence, security and intelligence services should be cut down and less money should be allocated for the upkeep of the government, the Office of the President and various government agencies.

Socialist faction MP's levelled sharp criticism at the budget. "It is a consumption-oriented budget, it withdraws from the economy and demonstrates a withdrawal of the state from the economy," the economists of the former Communist Party emphasized. At the same time, the BSP MP's made statements insisting that the budget should be geared to the needs of social policy.

BSP economist Stefan Stoilov today called for a review of interest policy. "The interest rates are set by the National Bank, not by the government, and they depend on the economic conditions," was Finance Minister Kostov's reaction. Professor Todor Vulchev, governor of the National Bank, undertook that once inflation declines the interest rate will be reduced. However, he does not think that this will happen this year. Parliament intends to [passage indistinct].

Trenchev Elected ICFTU Vice President

AU2603091992 Sofia BTA in English 1824 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Sofia, March 25 (BTA)—Dr. Konstantin Trechev, leader of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, was elected vice president of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions [ICFTU] today. He is attending the International Confederation's forum in Venezuela.

The 37-year-old Bulgarian trade-unionist was a dissident at the time of the communist regime and found himself in prison. In 1989, together with seven intellectuals, he founded Podkrepa, the first free trade union organization here. Dr. Trenchev is one of the founders of the Union of Democratic Forces which was set up at the end of 1989, after the removal of the communist leader Todor Zhivkov. Dr. Trenchev is a physician.

Since November 10, 1989, the Podkrepa Labor Confederation headed by Dr. Trenchev has been one of the most influential organizations in this country. Many people think that the credit for it goes to Dr. Trenchev. According to the latest opinion polls his rating is going up.

Prosecutor Initiates Inquiry of Vodenicharov

AU2603083992 Sofia Khristo Botev Radio Network in Bulgarian 1830 GMT Mar 92

[Text] Mr. Ivan Tatarchev, chief prosecutor of the republic, has instructed the First District Prosecutor's Office in Sofia to take preliminary legal procedures against Mr. Rumen Vodenicharov. The chief prosecutor adopted the decision after being tipped off by Mr. Georgi Panev, Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] National Assembly deputy, who submitted an official document to him on Mr. Rumen Vodenicharov's speech at the Bulgarian Socialist Party rally in Sofia on 21 March. In this speech, along with insulting statements against the SDS leadership, Mr. Vodenicharov described Ministers Dimitur Ludzhev and Yordan Sokolov as "traitors of the nation, who emasculated the Army, the police, and the intelligence service."

According to the Penal Procedural Code, the investigation should be concluded within a month.

SDS Rejects Miners' Demands, Supports Pushkarov

AU2603085992 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] The position of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] on the demands of the miners remains unchanged. This was reaffirmed at a news conference of the SDS parliamentary group. As a ruling coalition the SDS has no intention to increase the miners' wages, because, according to Mr. Aleksandur Yordanov, there is no normal state in the world where the miners receive higher wages than physicians and lawyers. It is abnormal to use the state budget for supporting unprofitable production and enterprises. They simply must be closed down, because this is the economic reality, it was pointed out at the news conference.

After the miners, the metallurgy workers most likely also will present their demands. The SDS parliamentary group thinks that it was a mistake on the part of the government to delay the working out of a program on redirecting the unemployed workers toward other branches. As far as the resignation of Minister Pushkarov is concerned, the SDS parliamentary group thinks that the resignation will not resolve the issue, because it is not the minister or his resignation that pose the problems, but rather the unprofitable productions.

Miners Dissatisfied With Talks

AU2603094692 Sofia BTA in English 1854 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Sofia, March 25 (BTA)—For several hours the government and representatives of the Podkrepa Miners Federation were discussing the future of uranium mining in Bulgaria, but their positions did not come any closer. The Podkrepa miners insist that while the Kozloduy Nuclear Power Plant is in operation, uranium mining in Bulgaria has future, on the other hand the cabinet refuses to subsidize unprofitable industries, including uranium mining.

The president of the Podkrepa Miners Federation, Dimitur Dimov, said after the talks that the miners' delegation is not satisfied with the results of the meeting, adding that the decision about the strike actions will be made by the National Strike Committee headquartered in Madan (Southern Bulgaria). Since yesterday the miners from the pits in the vicinity of the town have been preparing for strike.

The miners have not given up their demand for the resignation of the Minister of Industry and Trade, Ivan Pushkarov, stressing that his ministry has not done its job at all, it even did not present an employment programme for the people who will become redundant after the uranium mines are closed. This was one of the conditions set down in the frame agreement between the government and the miners which put an end to the miners' strike of August last year.

Today the Coordinating Council of the Union of Democratic Forces [UDF; SDS] in Plovdiv (Southern Bulgaria) took a stand against the demands raised by the Podkrepa miners who are protesting against the government plans to close down the lead and zinc production in the country. There is no room for metallurgy in the Plovdiv area, it is said in the declaration of the UDF in Plovdiv. It is the country's most fertile plane and it has been severely damaged by the lead and zinc works situated near Plovdiv.

The UDf-Affiliated Social Democrats also disapproved of the miners' demands and declared themselves to be against what they termed as trade-union terrorism. The Social Democrats described as immoral the miners' intention to take their children and wives to the pits. The UDF cannot accept a political strike, but admits some of the miners' social demands are justified, Aleksandur Yordanov, UDF deputy chairman and floor leader of the UDF Parliamentary Faction, told journalists today. Last night the UDF Parliamentary Faction had a meeting with representatives of the Podkrepa miners who are getting ready for strike. Some ministers also attended the meeting. It became clear that the miners had been misled by some trade-union leaders, Mr. Yordanov said, Edvin Sugarev, UDF MP, added that the strike had been inspired by some trade-union leaders who have certain economic interest in the non-ferrous industry.

According to Mr. Yordanov and Mr. Sugarev, the UDF backs up the plans of the government for closing down harmful and unprofitable productions, but reproaches the cabinet for not having worked out a programme for the relocation of those who would become redundant.

Calfa Views 'Disharmonious Tones' in Government

AU2503145892 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak 23 Mar 92 pp 1, 2

[Interview with CSFR Prime Minister Marian Calfa by Branislav Janik; place and date not given: "Breakup of Proclaimed Unanimity?"]

[Text] Two serious problems have recently surfaced in the Federal Government's work. First, political disagreements between ministers who are also party chairmen might have a certain impact on the government's activity. Second, tension has come about between the Federal Government and the Slovak Government over the Transpetrol issue. NARODNA OBRODA asked Federal Prime Minister Marian Calfa for his point of view. Today we publish his comments on the first problem, tomorrow we will return to the question marks hanging over Transpetrol.

[Janik] At the Civic Movement [OH] assembly, [OH Chairman] Jiri Dienstbier used rather strong words when criticizing Vaclav Klaus and the Civic Democratic Party [ODS].

[Calfa] Politicking, that is, a political perspective of things, has made its way into the government. The government has begun to split along two lines—according to the political affiliation of individual members and, in dealing with some issues, a Slovak-Czech division has also become noticeable.

[Janik] Why does this pressure make itself felt in the government?

[Calfa] Unfortunately, in the present situation when every trifle becomes politicized, even matters that have no political implications whatsoever, this is completely natural.

[Janik] You said that problems become politicized. This term is slowly but surely becoming a cliche. What does the politicization of a problem mean? Could you define it?

[Calfa] Attacks that are launched from political or ideological positions are introduced into debates on specific issues. When a view is expressed, it is not perceived as a question of fact, but rather is rejected on the grounds that it is monetarism, for example, or a relic from the system of planned economy, that it is antisocial, or, vice versa, that it is populist softness, etc.

[Janik] Can these things be heard in the government?

[Calfa] Yes, arguments based on such a point of view do appear there.

[Janik] When did the first such rifts make themselves felt, and when did the breakup of the proclaimed unanimity and readiness to jointly pursue a common goal start?

[Calfa] I would like to say that the government always finds a solution by putting a problem to a vote and creating a majority. Disharmonious tones could be heard, for example, when discussing the Czechoslovak-German treaty, and they also appeared in discussions on social issues, on coupon privatization, on the Transpetrol joint stock company, and the like.

[Janik] Do the disagreements within the cabinet influence the final decision, which is then presented as the government's common and single standpoint?

[Calfa] I try to get a clear standpoint from each government member and then discard any extreme expressions, if there are any, so that these expressions do not have any influence on the cabinet's final standpoint. I must say, however, that this is a normal phenomenon, the normal political procedure that is customary in advanced democracies. There, too, the cabinet does not discuss whether there should be a 10 percent tax or a 10.5 percent tax, but whether to introduce the tax at all and when and what it means politically for whom. Unfortunately, very often we still operate as repairmen of the economic mechanism, which, unlike in Western democracies, does not function on its own. In our country the government is being drawn into dealing with specific and often highly specialized situations. When you add to this the aforementioned political element, you must be really tough to isolate this element and deal with the problem on a pragmatic level.

[Janik] When you accomplish this, is it because of dexterity, the art of compromise, buck passing, or scheming?

[Calfa] It is by virtue of the art of leadership. Let us be serious. The government is a team of 16 people, each of whom means and represents something. My task is to ensure that this orchestra plays without hitting bad notes, insofar as possible.

Deputy Supports Possible Use of Army in Slovakia

AU2503193592 Prague TELEGRAF in Czech 24 Mar 92 p 1

[RS, JAK report: "Playing With Fire"]

[Text] Prague—"The Czechoslovak Army has sworn an oath of allegiance to the CSFR. Therefore, it is responsible for protecting the CSFR's integrity until its Constitution is legally amended. This means that if someone were to challenge this situation and try to change it by taking a nonconstitutional course of action, there would be a definite possibility of unrest and civil war," said Federal Assembly Deputy Miroslav Tyl, Christian Democratic Party (KDS) deputy chairman, at a press briefing held yesterday.

"If the state were to break up by nonconstitutional means, the state has a right to intervene," said Professor Vaclav Pavlicek of Charles University Faculty of Law Constitutional Law Department in connection with the aforementioned statement. In his opinion, however, nothing justifies using the Army to resolve internal

disputes. "Possible criminal activity by individuals would probably fall within the security organs' jurisdiction," added Pavlicek.

According to CSFR Interior Minister Jan Langos (Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence), the Slovak National Council's declaration of the Slovak Republic's independence would not conform to the intent of the laws requiring the deployment of security units or the Army. Consequently, there is no danger of force being used in the aforementioned situation as there would be no one to protect. "The issue in this situation would involve a legal move designed to encourage attempts to find a political solution," added Langos. As he said, the Army's oath of allegiance does not have greater legal authority than the Constitution and the laws according to which the Army is obliged to defend the CSFR's integrity from external attack. If the need arises, soldiers in active service can only support security units in defending the state borders or particularly important facilities.

"Members of federal security units can only be deployed if a direct violent attack is made on the federation's constitutional officials or—at the request of legitimate republican organs—on republican constitutional officials, attacks aimed at restricting their work or at making it impossible," explained Langos. He added that in practice this could involve, for example, threats to the federal or republican parliamentary buildings.

Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart (Civic Movement) would, in the event of nonconstitutional steps being taken on the Slovak side, be opposed to the Czechoslovak Army's intervention. "This is playing with fire. The Army is not here to deal with domestic political situations. I consider such remarks, if they are made by responsible politicians, to be irresponsible," said Pithart.

Czech Prime Minister's Weekly Interview

LD2503231792 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1730 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Weekly interview with Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart by reporter Zbynek Hones; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Hones] Prime Minister, the chapter entitled Causes of the Decline in the Czech Government's report submitted to deputies last week hints at, among other things, difficulties connected with the penetration of foreign capital into our incomplete market environment. What is the situation in regard to foreign capital?

[Pithart] The situation is decidedly not as described, above all in the left-wing press, which is trying to spread the fear among our people that we want to sell this country out; they talk about an economic Anschluss. Regrettably we have had to note that we have much less foreign capital in this country than required. The second question is what is its composition. The overwhelming proportion of foreign capital—of which, I must stress again, there is still little—is German capital. The purpose of the influx of foreign capital is to raise the level of our economy so that in 10 to 15 years people like us in Austria might start to wonder or even fear Czech capital beginning to penetrate into Austria or Hungary.

The fact is, of course, that money is not the sole issue. We always choose partners who will bring in technology, know-how, and managerial skills, which, let us admit, our people have not yet mastered. But, above all, that partner should make it possible for us to gain access to other markets. This means that along with the money that the partner brings in, markets open up to us through that company's presence in the world. We are thus, as it were, sharing in that partner's markets. As a consequence, all this enables us to expand and penetrate foreign markets in the years to come. Therefore, we definitely need foreign capital. You could ask what should be done to ensure that capital comes from all states and not mostly from one country. We now estimate that if all negotiations that have already started are completed, and if they turn out the way it seems they will, then the proportion of German capital will come down from the present 76 percent to 48 percent by about 1995. This is a more acceptable proportion, in view of the fact that Germany is our strongest neighbor and has the longest border with our country. Therefore, conditions have already been created to remove this disproportion, which is causing disquiet among some people and, in the run up to the election, provides an opportunity to left-wing politicians and journalists to frighten people. I can guarantee to you that we will never do anything to make ourselves dependent on a single country, whichever it may be. After all, we have our own experiences in this regard.

[Hones] You mentioned that after we have finished the learning process we ourselves may expand into other markets. In this connection, I would like to mention the government's report on the collapse of eastern markets and the loss of that market. This means that we are somewhat neglecting this sphere of our influence.

[Pithart] Our interest in the traditional eastern markets carries with it a big risk. I would put it this way: At this moment we would be terribly glad if all these ties with the former Soviet, now Russian, Ukrainian, Bulgarian, and Hungarian customers were restored. On the other hand, it would mean that we are binding ourselves to a market that is not too demanding, and although the restoration of these relations might console us for a while, we would soon find that success in Moscow or in Kharkov does not mean success in Brussels or Bern. Like everything else, this has its own risks. The best thing, of course, would be to find a balance and restore eastern markets for those branches that are still operating relatively well and that we would not like to contract or liquidate, while at the same time exposing ourselves to the enormous rigors of western markets. Only this will enable us to reach the head of the field. Otherwise we will be hopelessly at the rear.

[Hones] One thing that is impeding the influx of foreign capital is the constitutional instability in this country. I think that this subject is rather unfortunate for you because we tend to return to it again and again. Nonetheless, after the recent congress of the Movement for Democratic Slovakia, Mr. Meciar talked again about the declaration of sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, the adoption of a constitution of the Slovak Republic with a president as the head of the state.

[Pithart] What can I say to you? I am very sorry that the word sovereignty has lost its importance. Today the talk, not only in this country, is about shared sovereignty. Part of such sovereignty rests with the organs of the federation, and part with federal lands or republics. For me that word has lost any meaning because sovereignty is sovereignty only when it is at the top, at the very top, when it is indivisible. To talk about shared sovereignty seems to me equally as absurd as to talk about partial fullness.

Well, it has happened and that word is now used in such a way. What will happen when the sovereignty of Slovakia is declared? Nothing will happen, of course. Even if sovereignty were declared once more and even three times subsequently—today the Constitution already speaks about the sovereignty of the republics and, therefore, it does exist [as heard]—apparently this would be a kind of opportunity for festive speeches and for some people to be moved and for some, perhaps, to be justly aroused against us Czechs, but nothing would be altered as far as basics are concerned. We would, of course, have to explain to the citizens of the Czech Republic that nothing has changed in the constitutional relations, and not all of them would accept such an explanation.

With regard to the president of the Slovakia, this is a different matter. It presupposes another constitutional framework. Therefore, it is apparently a consideration meant for the postelection period. I have to say here that we really do not know how the various parties in Slovakia, as well as in the Czech Republic, will fare in the election, what they will have in their program, how many people will vote for them, and how many votes of confidence they will give them. Speaking personally, it does not matter one iota how our postelection setup is put together . I truly have only one great concern and that is that our search for and finding of new forms of mutual relations be without violence. I would regard it as violence if after a constitutional setup has been decided someone immediately tries to choke it off. From this perspective I do not care much about the forms. My concern is to ensure that the restlessness of southern and eastern Europe does not spread to us. Whether we find a solution at once or whether at first we have a transitional solution is not important. What is important is stability and calm on the territory of the present Czech and Slovak Federative Republic.

Minister on Prosecution of Former Security Agents

AU2603103692 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 24 Mar 92 pp 1, 16

[Interview with Federal Interior Minister Jan Langos by Jan Subert; place and date not given: "The Hidden Past"]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Langos] Numerous instances of violations by the State Security [StB] of laws then in effect have been proved—and there is a reasonable suspicion of many others. Some StB members—if the investigation warrants it—might be held responsible and prosecuted. A simple release of the StB classified material would render the investigation and eventual fair punishment of these people for their illegitimate activities extremely difficult, and sometimes impossible.

[Subert] Thus, following the assessment—and perhaps ensuing investigation—of individual actions, the reason for classifying the documentation should no longer exist....

[Langos] As minister, I have the authority to declassify individual cases, and I will use this authority in all instances in which the reason for secrecy has ceased to exist. The investigation of the StB operation is conducted by the Office for the Documentation and Investigation of StB Activities that is under my direct control. Its director has instructions to pass to my office all the documents following their assessment and investigation, and I can declassify them immediately.

[Subert] Does the same mechanism apply to the documents on foreign operation of the National Security Corps First Administration—i.e. the former Czechoslovak intelligence—which often functioned as a tool and an extended arm of the KGB?

[Langos] In principle, yes.

[Subert] The argument of "an existing possibility of prosecution," however, cannot explain the classification of documents from the years 1948-1989. The statute of limitations applies to those crimes. When will we know the complete truth about this period?

[Langos] A realistic chance exists of a legal measure being found that would make possible an imposition of a limit on the statute of limitation. Numerous lawyers are currently searching for a suitable argument, and it seems that their endeavors are not without success. Thus, it would be good to wait a bit and not hamper the potential investigation and punishment by the publication of incriminating evidence. If we want to create a state based on the rule of law, we should not allow those who caused the suffering of many people—even if it happened long time ago—to live unpunished next to their victims.

Nationwide Survey on Expected Voting Patterns

LD2503204592 Prague CSTK in English 1851 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Prague March 25 (CSTK)—Federal Finance Minister Vaclav Klaus's Civic Democratic Party (ODS) in the Czech republic and former Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) both remained atop the opinion polls in their republics this month.

A March 4-9 nationwide survey conducted by the institute for public opinion research showed the ODS, the country's firmest backers of radical market reforms, with roughly 19 per cent support in both provinces of the Czech republic, Bohemia and Moravia. This represents a three per cent drop since the last poll, taken February 3-10.

In Slovakia, the HZDS, which is highly critical of economic reform and calls for a Slovak constitution and president, experienced just a one per cent drop in popularity since February, from 31 to 30 per cent. ODS supporters tend to be more highly educated, satisfied with the progress of economic reform and trusting of the federal government. The HZDS draws more of its backing from Western than from Eastern Slovakia, and is most popular among voters with less than a secondary school education. 40 per cent of the Slovak respondents favouring the HZDS express distrust in federal officials.

Asked by pollers which political party or movement they would vote for if elections to the federal assembly (parliament) were held next week, eight per cent of the respondents in the Czech republic named the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSCM), moving the KSCM into second place ahead of the Czechoslovak Social Democrats (CSSD).

The KSCM continues to find sympathisers mainly among voters aged 60 and above, as well as among those distrusting the Federal Government and President Vaclav Havel. 25 per cent of its followers fear ill consequences from the new Czechoslovak-German friendship and cooperation treaty signed in February. Just behind the KSCM are the Social Democrats, with seven per cent support. The CSSD is also backed by voters concerned about the permanence of Czechoslovak-German borders as established by the treaty and by critics of the current economic reform policies.

Comprising the Czechoslovak Socialist Party, the Greens and the Agrarian Party, the Liberal Social Union (LSU) remained at number four in the Czech Republic. The LSU wants to defend the interests of middle and lower class citizens and finds equal support in the city and the country.

The percentage of undecided voters in the Czech republic increased from 26 to 33 per cent in the last month. 12 per cent of those surveyed said they do not plan to vote. Following the HZDS in the Slovak Republic were Slovak Premier Jan Carnogursky's Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), the Party of the Democratic Left (SDL) and the Slovak National Party (SNS), each supported by 13 per cent of the respondents.

The KDH finds greatest favour among older people in the Slovak Republic, with 21 per cent of its backers coming from those over 60. (Jan Klepac's Slovak Christian Democratic Movement (SKDH) had not yet broken off from the KDH at the time of the survey.) Led by Jozef Prokes, the nationalist SNS draws most of its support from voters aged 30-44, living in central Slovakia.

The SDL, successor to the former Slovak Communist Party, is led by Peter Weiss and is favoured by 22 per cent of the voters in the 45-59 age group. Both the SNS and the KDH received virtually the same rating this month as they did in February, while the SDL jumped four points from nine per cent. The Democratic Party (DS), which has already agreed to enter into a coalition with the right-wing ODS on the federal level, picked up one percentage point to reach five per cent, the cutoff point for winning a mandate to parliament. Undecided voters in Slovakia increased just one point to 17 per cent.

The majority of voters in both republics agreed that President Havel should not support any party or movement in the elections, an opinion whose strength increased with the respondent's level of education.

Asked which Czech parties they had the most reservations towards, voters in the Czech republic most frequently responded the KSCM (27 per cent), the ODS (17 per cent) and Miroslav Sladek's Assembly for the Republic-Czechoslovak Republican Party (SPR-RSC) (17 per cent). In Slovakia, voters were most doubtful of the KDH (31 per cent) and the pro-Federation Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence.

Court Rules Land Law Section Unconstitutional

LD2603102792 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1900 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] The Constitutional Court has ruled the paragraph of the Land Law ensuring the right of the first purchase option for large agricultural firms in the case of the sale of land or of a small farm on their territory as being unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court judges also rejected complaints against the revoking, without compensation, of the management right of social organizations over state properties.

Government Authorized To Abrogate Dam Project

LD2503154892 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1550 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Address by Ferenc Madl, minister without portfolio in charge of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam project, at a National Assembly session—live]

[Excerpts] The National Assembly has reached a turning point with regard to the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros issue. [passage omitted]

I would like to confine myself to a few significant points. One is that in parliament, and consequently in public opinion as well, the view has surfaced that the government is pulling in two directions in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros dam affair; that it has an informal, soft line and an official, more resolute line, and that perhaps it has also softened in comparison to its earlier stance. To this I would like to say the following:

The government has always acted in accordance with parliament's resolution and stance. [passage omitted] In itself, I see nothing peculiar that in preparing a political decision, in the human thinking process—with respect to essential issues—views do not correspond 100 percent. This multifaceted thinking occured at the level of the three National Assembly committees and also at the governmental level. The decision was reached—the one submitted to the House—and this is the government's stance from which it has not changed one iota. I, as the one authorized by the government, have not received from either the prime minister or the government any signal that I should represent a softer view. [passage omitted]

I turn now to summing up the significant elements of our decision, the draft resolution. [passage omitted] It has five essential elements:

The first is the enforced situation brought about by the Czechoslovak side through its unilateral acts, actions, and construction, that is, it intends to unilaterally complete the dam and wishes to put the power station into operation, which means diverting the Danube. This the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian National Assembly—this is in the draft resolution—cannot accept. [passage omitted]

The second element is the values which the Hungarian Government, the parliament, must also take into account: the friendly good-neighborly cooperation of the two countries; the future useful and constructive operational cooperation of the Visegrad Triangle, as opposed to the creation of potential tensions; the solution of legal disputes in mutual debates; mutually agreed solutions; the application of the norms of constitutional statehood to this area; and the evasion of tensions. These are the interests, the values on the basis of which the Hungarian Government turns again to the CSFR Government to ask it to accept the trilateral study, involving EC experts, of the ecological problems and all essential issues of the dam, and that as a result of the study to agree on a bilateral intergovernmental decision. The Hungarian side considers that during this time the other side should cease or suspend those unilateral steps which involve the diversion of the Danube. This is not an ultimatum, it is a natural request. [passage omitted] We expect this mutuality from the other side along with our request for a moratorium.

The third element, a very significant hard core of the decision, is that if the CSFR side decides to reject the Hungarian proposal—without taking into account all these requests, conditions, considerations—then the Hungarian side will have no option but to unilaterally abrogate the 1977 dam treaty.

The fourth element of the decision is that the government must be ready, following any rejection, to act to resolve the problems of ecological rehabilitation, ensuring navigation, and ensuring flood prevention. [passage omitted]

The fifth element is that it is not merely a CSFR-Hungarian affair. It is already clear that it has European and international dimensions, and will have even more if, as a result of any abrogation, a significant tension develops here in Central Europe. [passage omitted]

Hungary turns to the goverments of the CSCE states, the EC, the UN, the Danube Committee, and the Council of Europe to ask for their understanding, support, and cooperation, and hopes that the other side will accept the trilateral study with an open mind and will accept the moratorium. [passage omitted]

[Budapest MTI in English at 1826 GMT on 24 March notes: "The Hungarian parliament today authorised the government to abrogate the 1977 Hungarian-Czechoslovak agreement on the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage project if the Czechoslovak side fails to stop work violating the agreement by April 30, 1992."]

Sejm Committee Accepts Constitution Proposal

LD2503092192 Warsaw PAP in English 1827 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 24—The Sejm Legislative Committee accepted Tuesday [24 March] a new compromising proposal forwarded by the president under which the constitution should be first adopted by the National Assembly (the Sejm and Senate) and then accepted by the nation in a national referendum.

According to the previous presidential initiative the National Assembly was to approve only a draft law on the constitution which would be later adopted in a referendum while the deputies opined that the constitution should be adopted by the National Assembly and later on approved in a referendum if such a motion was to be forwarded by the president or parliament members.

"We have reached compromise on the crucial issue for the president, namely a referendum," Secretary of State in the Presidential Chancellery Lech Falandysz said and added the adoption of the constitution in the referendum entailed a similar procedure for amending it. "Only the nation will be entitled to change the constitution in the future," he underlined.

The new solution is to be submitted to parliamentary debate during a Sejm sitting scheduled for April 24-25. At the time deputies will also consider other disputable questions such as the composition of a constitutional committee. Contrary to the presidential proposal, M.P.'s [member of parliament] do not want representatives of the president, government and tribunal of state to be members of the committee although they accept their participation in its work.

Also, against the president's proposal the Legislative Committee refuses to give the government the right of legislative initiative on the constitution, saying that only the president, 56 members of the National Assembly and the constitutional committee itself should be authorised to propose constitution drafts.

SD Voices Concern in Delay Over Constitution

LD2403144592 Warsaw PAP in English 1911 GMT 22 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 22—The main council of the Democratic Party (SD) adopted a resolution on Sunday [22 March] in which it expressed its concern over the delay of work on a new constitution. The council said the delay will undermine the already scarce social confidence in parliament which "much too often has enough time for matters of little significance for Polands future but postpones matters which are of fundamental importance for her." The main council is in favour of holding a nationwide referendum on the principles of Polands political system. SD wants a new constitution to be a combination of proposals made by various parties and social organisations, previous parliamentary committees and individuals.

Council Debates Economic Plan, Recognizes Georgia

LD2503093492 Warsaw PAP in English 2100 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 24—The Council of Ministers discussed on Tuesday [24 March] a socioeconomic programme for the years 1992-1994 which envisages the overcoming of recession while maintaining the achievements of the stabilisation policy, the beginning of an economic growth, and the improving of state finances. Planning Minister Jerzy Eysymontt underlined that in order to reach the above goals this year's budget had to be implemented in its present shape and the policy of limited consumption pursued.

Among targets of the microeconomic policy the government listed promotion of exports and investment, a more efficient privatisation and support for restructuring projects. Measures introduced to heal public finances would limit inflation to a dozen-or-so per cent till 1994 while the budget deficit would be kept up to the safe level of 3 per cent of the gross domestic product.

Specific solutions for the next three years, concerning the reform of tax and insurance systems and investment credits, are expected to be approved by the government at its meeting on April 7. Also on Tuesday the Council of Ministers adopted a package of draft laws on normalisation, certificates, and measures aimed at adjusting Polish norms to European standards.

The government also recognised the independence of the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, accepting the Foreign Ministry's opinion that the current situation in that country did not pose any obstacles to establishing regular diplomatic relations between the two states.

Olszewski Aide Comments on Political Scene

AU2503120392 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 21-22 Mar 92 p 4

[Interview with Zdzislaw Najder, chief adviser to the prime minister, by Bozena Wawrzewska; place and date not given: "Something for Something"]

[Text] [Wawrzewska] What is an adviser to the prime minister? Is he the prime minister's conscience, telling him what he should do at a given moment, or does he produce reports which the government needs in order to do its work?

[Najder] There is no definite pattern. It all depends on who the adviser is and who the prime minister is. It depends on their personalities.

[Wawrzewska] But in the case of the Olszewski government, what is the cooperation between you and Prime Minister Olszewski like?

[Najder] I am often asked that question. I am also asked whether the prime minister ever asks me what to do.

Well, he seldom does. However, we do talk to each other frequently. That is one of the features of my job.

[Wawrzewska] I understand you discuss the economic, political, and social situation.

[Najder] The talks are very diversified. I consider it my role not to become involved in issues directly, but to view them from a certain distance, from a historical perspective. The prime minister appreciates that, not like most other Polish politicians. I see no reason to compare what is happening ion Poland now to what happened after the French Revolution, or after 1918, or any other time. My duty is to encourage the prime minister to consider his daily decisions as something urgent.

[Wawrzewska] From a historical angle, what do you think of events in Poland today?

[Najder] We are in a very intricate political and constitutional situation, one example of which is the political confusion inside and outside the Sejm and the low election turnout, a record low turnout by Polish standards. One should ask oneself basic questions like what is the government for, what are the duties of the Sejm, and what is the purpose of political parties. Is their primary function to halt the recession and redistribute the burdens of political transformation more fairly among the people, or to make sure they do not lose their supporters?

[Wawrzewska] Which do you think is more important?

[Najder] I think the first function is more important, but the second one is essential all the same. The first function is a fulfillment of primary tasks, and the second is a search for ways of doing this. My great concern for the future of this government is the result of the fact that the prime minister has to spend a lot of time gathering the resources necessary for him to perform his basic tasks. And yet this government is centered on the character and individuality of its prime minister to a greater extent than the two previous ones.

[Wawrzewska] This was supposed to be a government of many personalities, and yet, as you say, it is centered on the personality of just the prime minister.

[Najder] There are a few personalities in this government. There is no doubt about that.

[Wawrzewska] I suppose people expected more from the government.

[Najder] Yes. But in order to understand why the government is the way it is, and not some other way, we have to return to basic issues. In order to gain parliament's support for the program outlined in his inaugural speech, the prime minister had to seek support for himself inside parliament, and in order to gain that support, he had to offer each political group something. By the way, I bear a certain grudge toward political groups. They are so engrossed in short-term issues that they fail to consider certain matters, for example the purpose of the Sejm, which is supposed to be the representative of the whole nation, not just a few parties, especially if it was elected by two-fifths of society. Are parties merely mechanisms for winning an election, or are they also forums for the working out of political programs? As far as programs are concerned, there are not many differences between our parties. During the talks on forming a coalition, not enough was said about a program, but there was too much bickering and something which I would describe as a balancing act. The result was a coalition that, needless to say, does possess some cohesion. This setup, which one can generally describe as Christian-peasant, has a certain extraparliamentary quality. Because it is relatively cohesive, it is capable of penetrating society's consciousness, because the success of what we are doing depends neither on the Sejm, nor the president, nor the prime minister, but on the attitudes of the people. If we fail to win society's support, it will not be possible to implement the program of construction. The budget is stretched to the limit. This is a budget everyone is going to complain about. It is good that everyone is going to complain, for it means that no one is in a privileged position. But society must accept the budget. That is an essential condition for success. The present minority setup in the Sejm, with all its faults, has one quality. Despite its weaknesses, it looks relatively cohesive from the outside.

[Wawrzewska] Is such a Christian-peasant setup, even if outside the Sejm, sufficient for the program to be accepted? Will people from a peasant and Christian background understand and accept it?

[Najder] It is certainly not enough, but it does present a certain chance for our government to win society's trust, and for that reason I am worried about plans to alter the shape of this setup because I know such changes are received better by political circles than by the man in the street, who will not understand the reason for the changes. Political concepts must be understood by society, and I stress yet again that the most important part of the Polish political scene is the 60 percent of the electorate that did not vote. If this 60 percent continues to feel unrepresented and fails to understand what is happening, there could be trouble. Something which makes sense inside parliament may not work outside it, and may cause psychological damage. That is all I have to say about the present efforts to expand the coalition. I do not wish to interfere.

[Wawrzewska] If the Democratic Union joins the coalition, will the unrepresented voters suddenly feel represented?

[Najder] I think there are hardly any Democratic Union supporters among the 60 percent that did not vote. The Democratic Union's great strength is that it has a disciplined electorate.

[Wawrzewska] What is not you who suggested to the prime minister that the Democratic Union join the coalition?

[Najder] No, but almost everyone else did. In any case, it is a logical thing to do. When one wants to win more votes, one starts by holding talks with the largest parliamentary club.

[Wawrzewska] In other words, the Democratic Union can only join the coalition in the present Sejm setup, and no other.

[Najder] Yes, and only with the talented and prestigious people that are presently in office. This party contains many people of which the country should avail itself. We have not created suitable mechanisms to encourage this, and it seems we should create such mechanisms.

[Wawrzewska] Let us get back to the Sejm. It might not be perfect, but one has to cooperate with it all the same.

[Najder] Of course. I am firmly against any attempt to diminish the constitutional role of the Sejm. As long as we do not have a new constitution, we have to adhere rigidly to the old one, which says that the Sejm is the highest authority in the land. I think society agrees. For me, the most satisfying political news in recent weeks is the outcome of a public opinion poll held at the beginning of February, in which respondents were asked who is in control over the situation in Poland. Sixty-nine percent of them said no one. But in answer to the question do you accept a strong- arm government with a suspension of some democratic freedoms, the same percentage said no. Thus, the respondents message was: We are upset by the lack of order, but at the same time we reject any departure from democratic principles. We prefer to tread the more difficult road. That pleases me.

[Wawrzewska] But there should be some established rules of cooperation with the Sejm. Do you think this will merely be an ad hoc cooperation, occurring only when a major law is to be passed?

[Najder] I think right now the government is concentrating on presenting the budget to the Sejm and on the budget debate. I hope this will be an objective debate, not restricted to party ways of thinking, and that deputies will consider a better forms of budget. But if we do reject the budget, who will govern us? After all, we are in a disastrous situation in view of all the tasks facing us and the powerlessness of the political authorities in solving them. The Sejm must overcome this crisis on its own.

[Wawrzewska] But parties with divergent programs do cooperate with each other in times of crisis.

[Najder] That is true. One example was the British Government during the last war. But there was no political restructuring to be carried out, there was a war to be won instead. In any case, that government fell before the war had been won. Minority governments, or ones consisting of a setup of several parties, are capable of governing effectively and for a long time. But they do not implement any profound alterations to the state's structures, economic system, or mentality. Normally, such governments appear only in organized countries. I think some kind of ideological cohesion is required to perform the tasks ahead of us, otherwise people will feel confused. People must see who is in power, and who is in opposition. If instead they are offered some makeshift power arangement, the motivation stirred up by this government may quickly subside.

[Wawrzewska] Will the prime minister find enough support inside the Sejm to create this cohesion?

[Najder] I do not know. We will have to wait and see.

[Wawrzewska] Which parties do you think could cooperate with the government without spoiling the uniform coalition pattern?

[Najder] I think every party could, except the Alliance of the Democratic Left, but every party would find it a difficult thing to do, for various reasons. For example, Solidarity would find it very complicated. But I think the Confederation of Independent Poland [KPN] should alter its strategy and consider whether the attainment of long-term objectives is more important than struggling for a position. Because there is so much programmatic similarity between the parties, they should all pool their efforts into implementing the reforms. Even though the KPN is opposed to this government, society does not view it as a hostile party. In fact, opinion polls indicate that the KPN is becoming more popular. The KPN indulges in criticism and refuses to share any responsibility, but if it were to do so, the temporary popularity it enjoys might become more permanent.

[Wawrzewska] What about the Polish Peasant Party [PSL]? Will it join the coalition for good?

[Najder] The situation with the PSL is clearer. The PSL supports the government on many issues. I see a good future for it in a Christian-peasant coalition.

[Wawrzewska] Nevertheless, it is still burdened by the ghost of the old United Peasant Party. The PSL's origins are similar to those of the Alliance of the Democratic Left.

[Najder] Even so, the PSL has a chance to begin a new life, which will not be easy, because it will have to convince its voters that they should tighten their belts. Perhaps in that way an internal rejuvenation of the party will occur.

[Wawrzewska] In other words, something for something. Your message to the PSL is: Let us implement the reforms, and we will not keep intimidating you because of your past. Is that right?

[Najder] It is not a question of intimidation, it is a question of self-definition. The PSL must establish in what ways it differs from the other parties, and decide

whether what unites it is more important than what divides it. It must shake off a little of its communist past.

[Wawrzewska] Did you help draft the declaration which said that the present government would be a government of personalities, a breakthrough government, and a government of hope? The expression "government of hope" seems dangerous.

[Najder] The prime minister said he wants his government to be a government of hope. I think he is right to have such a wish, but for the time being this wish belongs to the future. It is merely the government's aspiration. The government must work to fulfill it.

Daily Details New Budget, Minister's Warnings

LD2303153592 Warsaw PAP in English 1452 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Warsaw, March 23—Polish Finance Minister Andrzej Olechowski presented a detailed picture of the State of Poland's finances at the beginning of 1992 in an article published in the RZECZPOSPLITA daily on Monday [23 March]. They are marked out by recession-trigerred slump of incomes and uncontrolled spendings on social welfare, harshly limited expenditures for investments, increasing public debt and suspended agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

A critical state of public finances is best illustrated by rapidly increasing expenditures on social welfare from 8.7 per cent of the current budget spendings in 1989 to 36.6 per cent in 1992. It is also reflected by a budget deficit which was 4.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GNP) in 1991 and is likely to rise to over 13 per cent of GDP if preventive measures are not undertaken.

The Polish Government is determined to take radical steps to halt these trends in economy, but according to Olechowski, "it is hard to improve the situation by reforming incomes." It would not be advisable to significantly increase budget revenues from domestic sources because of the threat of recession. It would be desirable, he claims, to increase foreign incomes, but this will be difficult due to suspended IMF stabilization programme and dwindling international credibility of Poland. The stress will be put on securing due payments to the budget.

Olechowski is of the opinion that it would be irresponsible to increase the budget deficit, because it would have to be financed with the credit of the central bank and this would lead to increased issuing of money and reigniting inflation. The target budget deficit has to be planned (5 per cent of GDP) and it cannot be exceeded.

Thus, the Polish Government has to cut spendings sharply. The reform is tantamount to the shift from consumption to investments. Savings should be obtained by ending automatic earning-related cost-of-living pay increases for state workers and by cutting state grants. The move has to be supported with a comprehensive anti-unemployment programme.

Poland should also cut spendings in public and transportation sectors. Sharp spending cuts can contribute to the increase of money for investments. Olechowski says that the ideal is that the budget deficit and growth-generating expenses balance in 1992. This is likely to happen later on, he adds.

Andrzej Olechowski expressed his conviction that the draft 1992 budget wins the approval of the Sejm and Senate. He is aware that its implementation may encounter difficulties, but expects the MPs [members of parliament] to give it an overwhelming support.

Defense Minister Refuses Military Restructuring

LD2503091292 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 0530 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] At a meeting with journalists, National Defense Minister Jan Parys said he disgrees with existing plans to restructure the Polish Armed Forces and refuses to implement them. According to Minister Parys, protection of Polish sovereignty is possible only in cooperation with, and thanks to, ties with Western countries, not thanks to internal organizational changes in the Polish Armed Forces.

Deputy Defense Minister Views Issue

LD2503133592 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1105 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Romuald Szeremietiew, deputy minister of national defense, described the difference of opinions on the restructuring of the armed forces between the Ministry of National Defense and the State Security Bureau [BBN] attached to the Presidential Chancellery as a natural symptom of democracy.

It would be bad for the Polish Armed Forces if we had only one concept, Minister Szeremietiew said in an interview for Radio Free Europe. According to him, the issue lies only in the fact that the appropriate body makes a decision on which concept to select within a legally binding time limit. I would not like the disagreements as to what the army should be like to last for years, he said. According to Szeremietiew, one reason for disagreements is the lack of precise demarcation lines of competence on armed forces' issues between the president and the minister of defense.

Trade, Economic Agreement Signed With Georgia

AU2503175392 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1502 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 25/3/1992—The first intergovernmental agreement between Romania and Georgia was signed in Bucharest Wednesday, March 25, on commercial and economic relations and technical and scientific collaboration as well as a protocol on goods exchanges and payments between the two countries in 1992. The documents, signed by Romanian Minister of Trade and Tourism Constantin Fota and Georgian Minister of the Economy Omar Vardzelashivili, provide the legal framework for the development of economic, technical and scientific relations between the economic agents in the two countries.

The agreement stipulates the granting of the most-favoured-nation clause, collaboration in practicing the principles of international law, inclusive of the application of the current world prices, discounts and payments on goods and services in free-convertible currency or in any form used in international banking, annual establishment, under intergovernmental protocol, of goods and services lists for unlimited mutual deliveries and services, support of direct links and cooperation in production, creation of joint enterprises, bilateral unions and organizations and of other forms of collaboration, setting up of joint commissions for the settlement of questions related to commercial exchanges.

The agreement was concluded for an unlimited period but each party can cancel it by notifying the other party six months beforehand.

Socialists Issue Statement on Transdnestr Conflict

AU2503175492 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1727 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES 25/3/1992—"The Socialist Party of Labour follows with unrest the escalation of the armed conflict in Transdnestr. We consider that the situation created in that region of the Republic of Moldova is part of a greater scenario initiated by those forces interested in maintaining their influence and which often use nationalist diversion to attain their purposes," reads a statement made by that political formation during the news conference of the Socialist Party of Labour on March 25.

The Socialist Party of Labour approves "the lucid stand in keeping with the international law expressed by Romania's president and government." The document also expresses the party's opinion that "the union does not depend firstly on Romania but on the future evolution of the situation and on the opinion of the population in the Republic of Moldova."

Answering the journalists' questions Ilie Verdet, president of the Socialist Party of Labour, announced that in the future general elections his party would fill candidates for all constituencies.

"We have declared ourselves right from the beginning a left party, a socialist party and we specified we delimitate from errors and from everything that was harmful in the previous regime," Ilie Verdet stated.

Nastase Outlines North Atlantic Council Goals

AU2503152392 Bucharest LUMEA in Romanian No. 12, 19 Mar 92 p 7

[Interview with Foreign Affairs Minister Adrian Nastase by N. Patrascu; place and date not given: "Our Country's Viewpoints Were Practically Similar to Those of the NATO Member States"]

[Text] [Patrascu] Mr. Minister, you have recently participated in the North Atlantic Cooperation Council's [NACC] first extraordinary meeting [in Brussels on 10 March]. Why was it an extraordinary session, what were its main agenda points, and with what results did it end?

[Nastase] To walk slowly now, when events are unfolding at a very fast pace, means that you will be left behind. The very creation of the NACC last December and the way in which its activity took off from then on prove, in my opinion, the intention of the member countries to keep abreast of developments in Europe, to influence their course as much as possible, and, in the future, to anticipate and ease up the various sources of tension and insecurity.

Seen from this angle, the time span between the first ordinary NACC meeting and the next one scheduled to take place in Oslo on 5 June has proved to be too long.

The need to adopt the NACC "Working Plan," the interest in making the newly independent states of the former USSR adhere to what we might already call "the North Atlantic cooperation process," and the need to encourage the successor countries to observe the obligations assumed by the former USSR through the treaty on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and to ratify it have led to this extraordinary session of the Council.

As a matter of fact, these were the three problems directly tackled by the Council at its recent session, which adopted conclusions and decisions based on consensus on each and every one of them.

Therefore, the NACC decided to receive the new independent states, thus bringing the number of NACC member states to 35.

At the same time, the Council gave the necessary political impetus to the new independent states by strongly emphasizing the need to speedily apply and implement the treaty on conventional forces reduction, without renegotiation before the CSCE summit in Helsinki, next July. At the same time, it has been decided to convene an extraordinary conference, parallel to the next NACC ordinary session in Oslo, on finalizing the ratification and implementation of that treaty.

Finally, the meeting adopted the "Working Plan for Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation," a document considered to be "a starting basis for the process of consultations and cooperation on security and the related problems."

[Patrascu] What other relevant aspects would you point out?

[Nastase] There is no doubt that the results of the extraordinary session go beyond the points written down in the documents adopted. Indeed, the meeting also discussed other topical issues; thus, importance was attached to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, where certain ideas were proposed regarding a more dynamic CSCE involvement in reaching a cease-fire there, granting humanitarian aid, and starting the negotiations process.

Since the NACC meeting took place only two weeks before the start of the diplomatic marathon for preparing next July's CSCE summit, the discussions also focused on European problems; in this respect, certain ideas were brought up, to be submitted to further substantial examination in the coming months.

Aside from that, the participation of foreign ministers from some 30 countries in this extraordinary session has facilitated many contacts, discussions, and other forms of dialogue on problems of mutual interest.

As far as we are concerned, we held meetings with several foreign ministers present at this meeting.

One can say that, generally speaking, the meeting was useful and productive and marked a significant moment in the promotion of dialogue and cooperation within the framework of the relations of partnership existing between the NACC member states.

[Patrascu] Your last remark leads me to the next question: what are the implications of the recent meeting? What is the political message of the speeches made there and what conclusions can be drawn from the proceedings of the extraordinary NACC session?

[Nastase] First of all, the decision to admit the successor states of the former USSR to the Council—thus continuing the process started on 20 December—is yet another step toward a new Euro-Atlantic community and projects the configuration of its future structures, in accordance with the new geopolitical realities on the continent. Therefore, a bold project, launched by the 16 NATO member nations, is gradually becoming a reality.

It is also important that, with their admission to the NACC, the newly independent states are no longer isolated or left to fend for themselves and at the exclusive mercy of the most powerful ones among them.

Participation in NACC means that you subscribe to the common efforts to jointly find viable answers to various challenges to the security and stability of all partner countries and of each one of them in the entire Euro-Atlantic space.

Of course, the latest meeting in Brussels had a special significance for Romania, as it marked the admission of the Republic of Moldova to the NACC, at a time when Moldova is confronted with the events in Transdniestria.

Second, I would like to recall that, as early as last fall, Romania supported the idea according to which, to optimize the impact of the envisaged measures for national security and regional stability, one should try to combine all these measures into a coherent strategy, within this partnership scheme, to give the states in Central and Eastern Europe the inherent attributes of partner countries, thus discouraging would be antagonistic actions and ensuring an additional degree of security based on solidarity. The adoption of the "Working Plan for Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation," reflects this need and marks an important step along these lines.

Now, when this important step was taken—which practically confirms the principle of nondifferentiation and nondiscrimination, so to say, in the development of relations of partnership—it is essential that this basic principle should be observed in the implementation of the "Working Plan" and in the establishment of new relations between NATO and the members states.

We also note the fact that our country's viewpoints were practically similar to those of the NATO member states, regarding the "Working Plan," the "Final Statement," the treaty on conventional forces, and other subjects tackled.

Our participation in the NACC extraordinary meeting also allowed us to emphasize our country's legitimate concern with strengthening national security and regional stability, by pointing out the importance Romania attaches to the broad development of the partner relationship with NATO, into which it puts great hopes; all these problems were dealt with in detail during the Bucharest visit of the secretary general of the North Atlantic alliance.

[Patrascu] Thank you for you opinions. Would you like to add something for our readers?

[Nastase] Of course, I could talk some more about such a topical and important set of problems of great interest for all of us. Maybe on another occasion.

However, I would like to add something for the editorial board and readers of LUMEA magazine, which might also be of interest to other people, too.

I believe LUMEA would be well advised to devote a page or two to Euro-Atlantic problems, where the readers are briefed on the activities of NATO, the Union of Western Europe, and other European structures as well as on the main documents adopted by these bodies and Romania's cooperation with them. As a first step in this direction, you might consider publishing the "Working Plan for Dialogue, Partnership, and Cooperation" in the next issue of your magazine.

Minister Addresses Industrial Restructuring Issues

AU2503105292 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 19 Mar 92 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Industry Minister Dan Anghel Constantinescu by Dan Vardie; place and date not given: "Restructuring Without Foreign Capital Is Not Possible"]

[Text] [Vardie] Minister, how do you explain the fact that, although you have been talking about *The Strategy of Industrial Restructuring* for more than year, it is only now that it is being published?

[Constantinescu] This is a very extensive work, and will, I hope, become the industry ministry's handbook. The fact that it appears now can be explained by objective and subjective reasons. One should note that the organizational structure was established only at the end of last spring through the finalization of trade companies and autonomous corporations. Without industrial entities, we were unable to start a strategy: Meanwhile, a legal framework has also been created. Now we also have the privatization law, which is also a possible solution for the restructuring process. True, we have not yet rallied and coordinated all the forces needed to substantiate such a process, even though this process began last year.

[Vardie] Nevertheless, do you not think that two years is rather long for working out an industrial strategy?

[Constantinescu] I can tell you that a minister has worked 10-12 hours a day from November to March. Certainly, it is not the volume that decides the scope of such a work, but its quality. Each industrial sector is dealt with in a booklet with a considerable number of pages. A total of 221 priority projects have also been outlined. Thus, foreign investors will find all the necessary information here, as it is drafted in accordance with the standards of the market economy.

[Vardie] What were the basic restructuring criteria?

[Constantinescu] From a systematic angle, we kept in mind, on the one hand, the elements of the current industrial structure—potential, consumption of resources, the capability of supporting imports through exports, efficiency, domestic and foreign market demands, environment compatibility, and trends in the European and world market—and, on the other hand, structure characteristics, costs, priorities, and restructuring policies and programs. We set three deadlines: 1992, 1995, and the year 2000.

[Vardie] You mentioned the consumption of resources. How did you give consideration to Romania's limited potential in this respect?

[Constantinescu] We kept in mind both current human and material resources and import opportunities as a result of exports. What we had in mind in this restructuring process was the idea of reducing our dependence on foreign factors. On the other hand, we cannot close down industrial branches simply because one of the raw materials needed is not available in our country. We also have to consider the correlation with other branches, social problems, foreign market problems, and we have to bear in mind the international situation. Therefore, we decided to adopt an optimal decision. There is no perfect decision. We are open to the opinions of specialists and of the press. We are sure that there is room for improvement in this strategy.

[Vardie] Are there any restrictions on activity in certain branches?

[Constantinescu] Obviously, the current structure will undergo changes. For example, an increase of 45 percent by 1995 and of 75 percent by the year 2000 is forecast for the textile and leather goods industries. As far as construction materials used in industrial activity are concerned, the share of prefabricated concrete will decrease by 60 percent in the year 2000 compared with 1989.

[Vardie] Does this not begin to resemble a plan?

[Constantinescu] Not at all, even though some people expect a plan for the next five years. I want to specify that this study has an orientational character and is not obligatory for anyone. An economic policy has to bear in mind such studies in order to ensure efficiency at the macroeconomic and microeconomic level. Along the same line of thought, I can tell you that the share of coal-fired thermopower plants will increase from 32.6 percent in 1991 to 48 percent by the year 2000, while hydrocarbon ones will decrease from 41 percent to 22 percent. All this, while increasing energy production from 54 million kWh to 81.4 million kWh by the year 2000. We also took into consideration that the first group of Cernavoda reactors will be put into operation in 1995.

[Vardie] Generally speaking, no country proposes to win "all the medals": Switzerland manufactures the best watches in the world, Japan the best television sets, and the United States the best computers. What do we propose to do?

[Constantinescu] We start from a different basis than the countries quoted as an example. Romanian industry is oriented toward all possible branches. In my opinion, it is impossible for us to specialize in a few branches. However, the development of certain industrial sectors will be stimulated. This will be done through investments, financial-banking measures, research policy, and a policy aimed at environment protection and recycling of waste.

[Vardie] What priorities have you borne in mind?

[Constantinescu] In our view, the energy and thermal industry is of primary importance as the foundation of the entire socioeconomic—thus, not only industrial—activity. A second priority are industries with a foreign currency contribution, such as electrical engines, certain sectors in the machine-building, furniture, textiles, and

leather goods industries, as well as pottery, sanitary installations, the light chemical industry, and this list may continue.

[Vardie] Given the recession experienced by the world economy, is the strategy proposed by the Ministry of Industry not taking shape on a "quicksand" foundation, thus becoming ephemeral?

[Constantinescu] It is quite normal to take account of the cyclic elements of the world economy. As you must have realized, the proposed strategy is actually a forecast. This study has to be readjusted annually. However, the long road the economy faces will not disappear. It may become shorter, it may become longer, but the speed at which one travels along it depends on what is happening in the world just as it depends on the economic policy promoted by the government in power. I believe that the world situation will be to Romania's advantage, even if we merely consider the tremendous market—which is difficult to cover—in the former USSR.

[Vardie] Does this strategy incorporate the improvement of product quality?

[Constantinescu] A restructuring strategy cannot pursue quality improvements; they are an objective of trade companies. We have taken into consideration the normal behavior of economic enterprises. However, if they act like kamikaze pilots, then the whole concept will fail. We have asked all companies to observe European and world norms regarding both technical and qualitative standards. We hope that the proposed policy will act as an impetus to improve product quality, but this strategy cannot replace market competition.

[Vardie] How will we proceed: Privatization through restructuring or first restructuring and then privatization?

[Constantinescu] I cannot believe that there will be anyone interested in buying an inefficient company. Privatization can be achieved if economic enterprises are viable and if there are people who can participate with capital. In the long term, one could promote restructuring and privatization side by side.

[Vardie] Have we not, perhaps, been witnessing a self-restructuring process ever since 1989? Will the proposed concept contradict or confirm it?

[Constantinescu] The fact that at the end of 1991 only 62 percent of the production capacity was operational, while 38 percent did not operate because of economic reasons, means that it is an unguided restructuring process. I would say that the strategy is pursuing this course because it starts out from the realities in our country.

[Vardie] Will we have the necessary funds to finance the restructuring process?

[Constantinescu] I want to be honest with you: I have calculated the total costs. We have estimates for priority projects. But you also have to bear in mind inflation and the fact that international influences may emerge. As far as financial resources are concerned, we have taken foreign capital into consideration. In the short term, a restructuring process is impossible with just our own financial means. Do not ask me for figures because I cannot take any chances.

[Vardie] Has this strategy also been endorsed by other Romanian or foreign specialists?

[Constantinescu] After it had been finalized in the ministry, this study was discussed by experienced specialists from various companies, research institutions, higher education, and the Romanian Academy. The third variant is now being discussed by the press and public opinion. At the foreign level, the study was presented to a World Bank delegation. The assessments made cause us to trust our work.

[Vardie] Minister, can you foresee in which direction Romanian industry is heading? Can you see the light at the end of the "tunnel?"

[Constantinescu] In my position as minister, I can only display reserved optimism. As a human being, however, I must say that I have a certain feeling of satisfaction. I feel and I can see that the way economic mechanisms function has changed, although this is not yet noted by the entire population. I am convinced that on the road toward the market economy, there is no going back.

International

UN Troops Expected To Arrive by 25 April

LD2503194792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1855 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 25 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government expects that the United Nations' Protection Force for Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) will take control of U.N. protected areas (UNPAS) by April 25 as scheduled, it was heard at today's session of the Federal Government. The most important thing at present is to do everything to secure respect for the cease-fire agreement by all sides to the conflict in Croatia, a statement from the session said.

"Every cease-fire violation objectively delays the start of the peace operation and the responsibility for this will rest solely with the violators," the government warned.

It was also said that conflicts in the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina might jeopardize the launching of the U.N. peace operation in Yugoslavia. The Federal Government urged the Bosnia-Hercegovina Government to to everything within its constitutional powers to prevent conflicts and protect the personal security and property of all citizens of the republic, regardless of their nationality or religion. In the opinion of the Federal Government, Bosnia-Hercegovina must reach a negotiated solution to its problems in a peaceful and democratic way, taking into account the interests of its three constitutive nations—Muslims, Serbs and Croats. The government today decided to extend special air and road traffic services to UNPROFOR troops.

GATT To Decide on Continued Serbian Sanctions

LD2503182492 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1634 GMT 24 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 24 (TANJUG)—The Council of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) will form an arbitration by the end of the first week of April at the latest to examine whether the European Community sanctions against the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia are justified and whether they will be maintained, assistant Yugoslav Foreign Trade Minister Boran Karadjole said here today.

Karadjole told the press that on Yugoslavia's initiative, the GATT council unanimously decided last Wednesday to form a three-member arbitration which should give its opinion about the E.C. measures in six months at the latest.

He also said that neither Yugoslavia's position nor its legitimacy as one of the 104 GATT signatories had been questioned. The E.C. last November introduced sanctions against Yugoslavia but retained them only against Serbia on the grounds that this Yugoslav republic obstructs the Conference on Yugoslavia chaired by Lord Carrington. Karadjole explained that the final ruling of the GATT arbitration, regardless of what it will be, would not be binding on the E.C. It will only be a recommendation, he added.

"At present, I cannot predict whether the sanctions against Serbia will be lifted on April 6, bearing in mind the strong influence of the so-called pro-German bloc within the European Community," Karadjole said.

He also said he could not assess the damage incurred to Yugoslavia and Serbia by the sanctions, but added that Yugoslavia would stand up for its rights because it had all the strong arguments for winning this case.

"Yugoslavia will do so not only to protect its own interests, but also because introducing economic sanctions for political reasons is a precedent, which, unless condemned today, can strike other countries already tomorrow," Karadjole said in conclusion.

Interrepublic

Determination of Croatian-Slovene Borders

92BA0679B Split SLOBODNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 13 Mar 92 p 17

[Excerpts from an interview with Josko Moric, Croatian assistant minister for internal affairs and chairman of the commission for establishing the border with Slovenia, by Alfons Soljan; place and date not given: "Hard Interest—Soft Border"]

[Text] We are reprinting from NOVI LIST of Rijeka excerpts from an interview conducted by journalist Alfons Soljan with Mr. Josko Moric, assistant minister for internal affairs of Croatia, who is at the same time chairman of the commission for establishing the border with Slovenia.

[Soljan] Mr. Moric, can you tell us what progress has been made so far and what has been agreed with our neighbors from Slovenia concerning establishment of the border between the two states?

[Moric] In the talks so far, we have established that we will establish the border line simultaneously over the entire length of the border....

[Soljan] Does that mean also at sea?

[Moric] Of course. I intentionally do not divide the border into land and sea, nor has a separate commission been formed to establish one or the other....

[Soljan] It is an old border, and by and large there are no major points in dispute. Nevertheless, some are mentioned in Medjumurje, in Zumberak, in Istria. If you have already examined some of the possible points "in dispute," would you please tell us something about them?

[Moric] This is an occasion to deny the various speculations there have been in the public and to state responsibly that neither side has any territorial claims, nor could have. The trouble is simply that the configuration of the terrain and the attitude toward the border between Slovenia and Croatia that has prevailed up to now in the former Yugoslavia do not provide conditions to mark the border without question; they simply do not give us an opportunity to say in precisely what direction the boundary line goes, but it is in question, because neither we nor the Slovenes know where it is. And that has yet to be established. So there are points in question, but, still, they are only technical points....

[Soljan] Most of the writing and talk in public has been about Savudrija and the so-called corridors. Have you talked about that with your Slovene counterparts?

[Moric] In the meeting of the diplomatic commissions of the two states, there has been no mention of Savudrija at all as yet. At no point has anyone mentioned Savudrija peninsula at all. Of course, the Croatian side has not only its position on this, it also has its right, and because the Slovene side has not mentioned it, we in the commission believe that this is only speculation on the part of uninformed people.

[Soljan] Has there been talk about the border at sea, that is, about fishing?

[Moric] There has been no mention of the border at sea being in question, or, more precisely, there have been no demands from the Slovene side that we make certain concessions for fishing in the territorial waters of the Croatian state. But in one of the meetings the Croatian side did give the Slovene side, as an idea for reflection, data on our interests in possibly talking about transportation corridors in the direction of Italy and Austria, which would presuppose elimination of a border control. This is certainly an internal matter of the Slovene state, and we offered the idea for reflection, without any intention to impose it or to offer something else in return, because we are not prepared and will not trade off Croatian territory, so we do not expect that the Slovenes will trade off theirs.

[Soljan] Can you tell us what kind of regime will prevail at border crossings, especially in view of the desire of the local population for it to be as "relaxed" as possible?

[Moric] Everywhere in the world the border regime is a direct consequence of intergovernmental relations. We are working with the Slovene side in order to make the border regime as liberal and effective as possible. In that direction, we will soon be concluding an agreement in which we will define the border regime. Incidentally, even now it is very liberal—there are few states which you can enter with an identity card.

As you know, Croatia is a tourist country, and so we have agreed, just to illustrate, that at high-traffic border crossings such as Bregana and Macelj, that is, on the main and international highway routes, separate traffic lanes would be designated for nationals of third states than the lanes which would be used by Croatian and Slovene nationals.

Federal

NBJ Official on Foreign Exchange Reserves

92BA0666C Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 10 Mar 92 p 10

[Article by Bojana Jager: "The Emptied Foreign Exchange Treasury"]

[Text] Belgrade—Reconciliation of changes in foreign exchange policy was again postponed at yesterday's meeting of the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, in the expectation that the Vojvodina Assembly would hold a session in which it would adopt views concerning the draft of this decision. Because these are proposals on how to replenish the foreign exchange reserves in the NBJ [National Bank of Yugoslavia], which at the moment does not have a single source to back it up, the situation is for all practical purposes deteriorating with each passing day. According to Dr. Branko Dragas, NBJ vice governor, $1.5 billion need to be furnished this year to pay off foreign loans and interest for the four republics which are still in the country's joint monetary system.

In the first two months of this year and the first six days of March, $835 million were spent from the joint foreign exchange treasury, or $776 million directly from the foreign exchange reserves of the NBJ. That is actually the size of the reduction of foreign exchange reserves. If their exhaustion were to continue at this rate, and there were no replenishment at all, it is clear where that would quickly end up. Especially because at the moment the country's foreign exchange reserves amount to about $2.5 billion, of which the part handled by the central bank is $1.98 billion.

According to figures available up to 20 February, $300 million went to meet obligations abroad, certain convention obligations were met, $180 million were approved to import raw energy, $30 million to import manufactured fertilizers and other supplies for agriculture, and another $50 million to import medicine and medical supplies. It is obvious, then, that the country's external liquidity has been maintained by means of foreign exchange reserves. At the same time, reduced exports are not bringing in sufficient foreign exchange, the inflow from services is minimal, remittances from abroad have almost dried up, and there are no loans from abroad whatsoever. The republics are now adopting regulations which channel foreign exchange into the republic foreign exchange treasuries, on the excuse that the issue has not been settled at the federal level. That is why it needs to be dealt with appropriately as soon as possible, and that would then presuppose rescindment of these republic regulations, Dragas warns.

The present situation, in which the country's foreign exchange balance is obviously threatened, could be overcome provided that this decision is adopted and replenishment of the foreign exchange reserves in the central bank is guaranteed, and then that relations with foreign creditors are reevaluated, and reliance is also being placed on activation of certain foreign project credits. A certain willingness on the part of the World Bank has been expressed at least for the latter. Certainly, it will take more time and certain conditions for relations with the IMF to thaw.

In answering delegates' questions, Dragas explained that Slovenia and Croatia, which have seceded, have signed documents to the effect that they themselves will pay off their credit obligations abroad, and if B-H [Bosnia-Hercegovina] actually does introduce its own currency, it will have to do the same. NBJ governor, Dusan Vlatkovic, will provide more detailed information on all this today to the delegates in the Chamber of Republics and Provinces.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

War Reportedly 'Raging' in Bosanski Brod

AU2503145492 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Bosanski Brod is in a war fever again today. Everything started last night after 2200 [2100 GMT]. Zivko Savkovic reports from Bosanski Brod.

[Begin Savkovic recording] At Bosnia's door, in Bosanski Brod, people are (?violently) dying, houses are being destroyed, people are sweating and suffering. There is no official information but there are dead and wounded on both sides. The crisis headquarters in the town has announced that two people were killed. The Serbian sides admitted that two people were killed. The number of wounded is increasing all the time and everything is based on assumptions. In addition to many damaged apartments, some twenty houses were also destroyed or burned.

The Serbian Crisis Headquarters in Lijesce stated that a cease-fire agreement had been reached on five occasions, but that the Croatian occupational forces did not respect any of these agreements, and therefore the clash continued. The Croatian Crisis Headquarters stated that more than 1,100 shells were fired. True, it is claimed that these shells were fired by (?Serbs). If this were the case, than more than 2,000 shells were fired in the commune, if this is possible at all in some 10 hours of fighting.

Fikret Abdic, member of the Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Sulejman Hrle, president of the Trade Unions of Bosnia-Hercegovina, today visited the Bosanski Brod oil refinery. However no expert was allowed to visit the plant and discuss the resumption of production in this big organization. Abdic and Hrle appealed to the crisis headquarters to negotiate rather than fight, but so far no one has responded to their appeal.

According to a reliable source, several hundred members of the Croatian National Guard and the Croatian Defense Union arrived in Bosanski Brod today. Their mass movements have also been noticed on the territory of Odzak, which borders on the Serbian commune of Bosanski Brod.

We have learned from very reliable sources that the Yugoslav People's Army has so far not taken part in any way in the conflict in Bosanski Brod, where war is raging. [end recording]

HDZ Leaders Arrested, Forces Mobilize Nearby

AU2503210292 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Fadil Pelasic report]

[Text] [Words indistinct] of insecurity is spreading to the Derventa commune, which is adjacent to Bosanski Brod.

Today at 1605 [1505 GMT], Iko Stanic, president of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] for Bosanska Posavina, was arrested with Drago Majic, HDZ secretary, and Lucio [word indistinct], member of the HDZ Communal Committee of Derventa. This news resulted in anxiety among the HDZ members.

As we were told by Ivan (?Busara), head of the Public Security Station in Derventa, 10,000 HDZ members from Derventa, Odzak, and Modrica are ready to liberate its members. According to the head of the Public Security Station, the Army made it clear that if one single bullet is fired toward the barracks, the Army will respond with countermeasures. As we learned 10 minutes ago, information has arrived from military sources that all detainees will be released soon. This is certainly something that will help ease tensions in the Derventa commune.

Let us also add that all shops closed early, afternoon classes in schools were dismissed, and that the town is practically dead. The HDZ Crisis Headquarters for Bosanska Posavina issued a statement today which demands that the Army leave Derventa. This demand probably caused the disputes that are emerging in this commune.

Shelling Continues

AU2503205692 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Just before this newscast we contacted the Bosanski Brod Crisis Headquarters. This telephone report has been prepared by Nada Rajkovic:

[Begin recording] [Rajkovic] Armin Pohara is vice president of the Crisis Headquarters of Bosanski Brod. What is the situation there?

[Pohara] The situation in Bosanski Brod continues to be very tense [passage indistinct] the Serbian outlaws and the Yugoslav Army launched over 1,300 shells on Bosanski Brod, from mortars, tanks, howitzers, in all possible ways. We still do not have an exact number of casualties, although there are even bodies in the streets, but it is certain that there are far more on their side than ours. Our men have already liberated part of the town. They advanced and are now clearing the ground.

What Bosanski Brod is going through now, I think, is even beyond the suffering it endured in World War II or any other time in the history of this small town at the doorstep of Bosnia. The installations of vital importance are being targeted—the oil refinery, water reservoir, the Metalemalj company, the textile factory, the fire brigade hall—all are being pounded. This place is a real hell, people are down in the cellars. Brave defenders of the town are holding each line and, as I already said, they have already advanced into the territory formerly under the control of the Serbian outlaws who attacked their own town.

[Rajkovic] Are there any indications that the situation will abate?

[Pohara] It has been a little more peaceful since it was announced that someone from the Republic, some commissions, will come. Fikret Abdic, member of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, visited Bosanski Brod today. We thank him from the bottom of our hearts, because he was the only person who had the courage to come to Bosanski Brod while the town was being showered with explosives. He was in the oil refinery when shells were landing on it. He was the first person who had the courage to come to this town, together with Mr. Sulejman [word indistinct].

[Rajic] Did you manage to contact the representatives of the Serbian side?

[Pohara] We had contact with them for a while. At the moment, however, there is no dialogue with them. They have almost destroyed this town, so for the time being any future talks are over as far as we are concerned. We will go

on liberating the town although, as the military hardware goes...[changes thought] a few days ago the Army brought 16 tanks to this region and have been pounding this town with them. I always say, justice and truth are on our side. We are not only defending Bosanski Brod here but also Bosnia-Hercegovina. I have just been told that we are without water. The situation is tense. I am telling you that there are plenty of dead and wounded, but we are keeping the town under control and we are going forward.

[Rajic] We did not manage to make contact with the part of the town that is under Serbian control. [end recording]

Croats Call for Army Withdrawal

AU2603104392 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] This afternoon, Vinko Begic, mayor of the Derventa commune, addressed the residents via Derventa Radio. Speaking in front of the Crisis Headquarters of the Croatian Community of Bosanska Posavina, he presented the following demands:

First, fire must be stopped unconditionally in Bosanski Brod. The Yugoslav Army must withdraw from Bosanski Brod and Derventa, including the Derventa barracks. The Crisis Headquarters of the Croatian Community of Bosanska Posavina demands that weapons be returned to the warehouses of the Territorial Defense (?on Rabic) and that these weapons be made available to the Communal Staff of the Territorial Defense of Derventa. Two youths, Vlado Barisic, from Modran, and Ivica Katelic, from the village of Ritesic, must be released, together with six passenger cars that have been seized.

The Crisis Headquarters of the Croatian Community of Bosanaka Posavina decided to block all roads between Bosnian Krajina and Serbia. According to our correspondent, this last decision is already being implemented, because several barricades have already been erected on the main Doboj-Derventa-Bosanski Brod road. Traffic has been disrupted. At present, the road is blocked in Johovac, Komarica, Zivince, and Polje, near Derventa.

HDZ Leaders Released

LD2603105692 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 26 Mar 92

[Vladimir Fajgl report]

[Excerpts] Iko Stanic, a deputy in the assembly of Bosnia-Hercegovina, member of the Presidency of the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] of Bosnia-Hercegovina, president of the Croatian commune of Bosanska Posavina and one of the members of the HDZ delegation to interparty negotiations at the EC, Lucija Ventl, president of the HDZ municipal comittee of Derventa, and HDZ Secretary Drago Majic, who were detained yesterday, were released from Derventa barracks at about 2100 last night. [passage omitted]

Two Croats, Vlado Barisic from Modrane, and Ivica Katavic from Ripesic, are still in the military prison. Their release is demanded, as well as the return to the owners of six private cars that were confiscated. I have been informed that following the arrest of these two young men, members of the HDZ from Modrane took two army reservists from a bus, and are now holding them as hostages.

According to a report from the municipal center for information, last night, at midnight, on the road for Kalenderovci in Derventa municipality, an incident with tragic consequences took place. A machine gun burst was fired into a passanger car driven by Dusan Saric from Derventa. Saric was seriously wounded and he died on the way to the hospital. Otherwise, last night derventa municipality was calm and without incidents. All the roads approaching Derventa from the west and southeast are still blocked.

Presidency Demands Cease-Fire in Bosanski Brod

LD2503235192 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2312 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Sarajevo, 25 Mar (TANJUG)—A meeting of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency was held in Sarajevo this evening, presided over by Presidency member Ejup Ganic, who is standing in for the president in his absence. It was stated afterwards that the session examined the complex political and security situation in the region of the Bosanski Brod and Derventa municipalities. It was concluded that there should be an immediate and complete cease-fire between the sides in the conflict.

In addition, the conclusions of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency of 22 March should be implemented urgently; that is, the withdrawal of Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] forces from the region of the Bosanski Brod municipality should be carried out as well as the withdrawal of all members of volunteer units from outside the municipality. This should begin at 1200 [1100 GMT] on 26 March at the latest. If the withdrawal of the said opposing forces does not begin within the set deadline, the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency will hold a meeting at 1400 on 26 March and will inform the UN Security Council and the world public that there has been an outbreak of internal aggression on the territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the statement says. Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency member Biljana Plavsic, in her own name and on behalf of Presidency member Nikola Koljevic, opposed the withdrawal of the JNA from these conflict zones, the statement says.

Army, Presidency Discuss Bosanski Brod

AU2503210892 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] Fighting in Bosanski Brod was the topic of today's talks between Ejub Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, and Colonel General Milutin Kukanjac, commander of the Second Military District.

After this meeting, which was closed to the public, Kukanjac told reporters that the reports of Yugoslav Peoples' Army [JNA] forces being directly involved in the fighting in Bosanski Brod are all fabrications and that the JNA did not even hurt a fly last night.

Ejub Ganic, who is substituting for the absent president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency [Alija Izetbegovic], said

that tanks were reportedly used in the shelling of this town. He asked where the Serbian Democratic Party forces had obtained artillery and concluded that it is logical that they had gotten it from the Army. Ganic also said that it is logical to assume that the other side obtained its artillery from the Croatian National Guard.

In order to obtain a clear picture of who is actually doing the shooting, Ganic said, we agreed to form two Ministry of Internal Affairs commissions that the JNA will accompany (?to the) other side in Bosanski Brod, as the oil refinery and Bosanski Brod bridge are at stake and thus the Army's responsibility is great.

Muslim Party Rejects Division of Bosnia

AU2503181392 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] At the talks on Bosnia-Hercegovina in Brussels on 30-31 April, the delegation of the Party of Democratic Action will strive for a unified and civil [gradjanska] state of Bosnia-Hercegovina. This was stated by Irfan Ajanovic, spokesman of the Party of Democratic Action, at the party's regular news conference. Nebojsa Nikolic reports from Sarajevo:

[Begin Nikolic recording] We will propose to our partners to abandon the idea of dividing Bosnia-Hercegovina according to the ethnic principle alone, Ajanovic said, and added that if this did not happen, the Party of Democratic Action will be forced to play this absurd game to the end. However, I am convinced that the referendum of the citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina will show that the vast majority is against the division of this republic, Ajanovic said.

We accepted the EC's document, but not because we agree with its content, rather so not to endanger the international recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Ajanovic said, stressing that the extraordinary Karadzic-Boban tandem persistently insisted in the Konak Villa in Sarajevo on the ethnic-national division of Bosnia-Hercegovina. This was accepted by Jose Cutilheiro, and the balance of forces was three to one.

The Party of Democratic Action today issued a statement appealing to all citizens of Bosnia-Hercegovina to reject the division of this republic on the nationality principles alone. The incidents that are now taking place in Bosnia-Hercegovina are being deliberately caused in cooperation with extreme forces from Serbia and Croatia so that the pie called Bosnia-Hercegovina is later divided between Belgrade and Zagreb, the statement issued by the Party of Democratic Action points out. Alija Izetbegovic holds the identical view on the document adopted in Sarajevo and the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

In a brief interview in today's issue of Sarajevo OSLOBODJENJE, Alija Izetbegovic stated that no ethnic divisions in Bosnia-Hercegovina are possible because the population is very mixed. In a reply to the question of why he then accepted the EC document, Izetebegovic said that he was isolated and that his idea was not accepted by the other two parties. The European mediators forced us to accept this document, Izetbegovic said, because, in case we said no, Bosnia-Hercegovina's international legal recognition would be jeopardized, which is our main objective at present.

Answering the question of how he would vote at a referendum, Alija Izetbegovic said that he would vote in the negative. [end recording]

Croatia

Alert Sounded in Daruvar, Doljani, Sirac

LD2503234292 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Text] According to the command of the Bjelovar operative zone, the aggressor this evening resumed its artillery attacks on Daruvar and Sirac. From its strongholds on Mt. Psunj, the enemy has been using artillery weapons and multiple rocket launchers. A general alert and a blackout are in force in Daruvar, Doljani, and Sirac. The population is in shelters.

Need for Croatian Dinar in Krajina

92BA0666B Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 10 Mar 92 p 2

[Article by Ivica Marijacic, Zadar: "The Croatian Dinar Is Taking Over 'Krajina'"]

[Text] One source of the Croatian public's nervousness is the question of whether the vague areas and "technical" problems in the UN peace plan are to the advantage of Croatia or to the opposite side? Whose currency is valid on the Croatian territory now occupied, whose legal system, and how will the police be organized? The UN peace plan does not offer altogether firm replies, and that has been the source of numerous criticism of the Croatian government, which supposedly accepted without conditions everything that was offered to it, and, according to some, almost signed a capitulation.

The time will soon be coming for answers to many of these questions, while some will be resolved during the actual course of the peacekeeping operation itself. For Croatia, at this moment the most important question is the return to their settlements, most of which have been burned, of those driven out, that is, restoration of that ethnic composition of the population that existed in those areas at the time of the population census. Not only is this a prerequisite for resolving all those "technical" difficulties, in importance it is a question of peace or war. If the peacekeeping forces make it possible without conditions for thousands of those driven out to return, and the Croatian state is able to see that their return results in their permanent stay and continuation of their life, then half the job has been done concerning restoration of Croatian sovereignty over the territories occupied at the moment. Then it is possible to see the answers to many questions which are now evoking doubtful comments and radical allegations to the effect that Croatia has supposedly given up its territory.

The Minimum for Return

Can we imagine, for example, that the Serbian dinar will be in circulation in Drnis? Hardly, because the Croatian population holds an immense majority there. Even if someone reached an agreement to the effect that a foreign currency would prevail there, it is quite certain that after its return, the Croatian population will not accept anyone's money except Croatian currency. Much the same is true of the legal system. And that will be the process followed by those who return to Vrlica, Krusevo, Kijevo, Jasenice, and all the other occupied Croatian towns and villages in which the Croats are in the majority and which are now groaning under the boot of the Serbian occupation. It will be that way in a number of occupied Croatian villages around Benkovac, and in general everywhere in Croatia. It is almost impossible to imagine that the Croats in those places will spend a Serbian dinar in local trade or in the tavern, or will voluntarily agree to come under the Serbian legal system. If that is the minimum which the international peacekeeping operation ensures, and without that it is certain that no one will return, then for all practical purposes Croatian sovereignty has been restored to those areas wherever the Croats are in the majority. The fact that this will be a demilitarized zone will not be decisive in answering the question of whose territory it is. The clear response will be given only by the population in the overall way in which it organizes its life.

Certainly, we should not have any illusion that this return of Croatian sovereignty will be painless. The Serbian extremists will attempt everything, including armed terrorist actions, to prevent that train of events. There will be particular resistance concerning introduction of the Croatian legal system and the features of Croatian sovereignty in the towns of the 11 opcinas where the Serbs are in the majority. The "Krajina" leaders will try at any price and in any way to continue "separation" from Croatia. Among other things, by retaining Serbian currency.

At First—Two Currencies?

As a consequence, it is probable that in the first months of the peacekeeping operation two currencies will be valid—because the Serbs will not want the Croatian dinar and the Croats will not want the Serbian dinar. Then economic logic should decide—to the advantage of the Croatian proposal, because not a single Serbian dinar has been earned in the "Krajina," but rather it has been given by mother Serbia from the Topcider plant printing counterfeit money. Because over the last month or two the mother has turned into a stepmother and is not issuing freshly printed bank note paper, the Serbs in Croatia will not be able to count on that help, nor on shipments of goods, because up to now the "stepchild" has not paid for a single one, nor can it, because it has nothing with which to pay for it.

For a month now, there has been no fuel in the "Krajina," so that trains and buses are running only on one or two lines, there is a horrible shortage of products of the food processing industry and other foodstuffs. It will be a real miracle, then, if someone continues to build the independence of the "Krajina" on the Serbian dinar. What is more, in the "Krajina" no one is doing business, nor is there a single job in which new value is being created. Everything that is being received in the form of earnings is that counterfeit Yugomoney which, it is true, does circulate in the "Krajina," but there is less and less one can buy with it, and it is becoming easier and easier to die of hunger. There are more and more people without any income, and numerous industries are paralyzed. How will the 3,000 railroad workers in Knin earn their salaries unless they become part of the system of Croatian railroads and earn the Croatian dinar? Where and to whom will the "Krajina" farmers and animal husbandrymen sell their products if not to the nearby towns and "markets"—once again for the Croatian dinar?

The Emptied Serbian Purse

How do they expect to start up once again the plants of many factories which have not been operating since the war began and which "became independent" and were left without work—unless they return to their parent enterprises in Zadar, Split, and Zagreb, that is, unless they earn the Croatian dinar? Much the same is true of the trade sector, supply, and all other activities in this area. Those who hold power in the "Krajina" would like to skip over that economic need, but they can avoid it only if Serbia continues to fill their bottomless purse. But because the Serbian purse is empty and Serbia has already taken its position concerning that kind of cooperation, it is clear why the Serbs in Croatia can do nothing else but return to Croatia. For a long time now, the "Krajina" has only been pretending that it could do without Croatia, because the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] was still present there and its "fuel" tanks are still not empty, nor its large stores of canned goods and food. But when the Yugoarmy leaves, insistence on a separate state becomes a question of bare survival. So, however unclear many "technical" questions may be in the UN peace plan, the future train of events on the temporarily occupied territory will favor Croatia and the restoration of its sovereignty over those areas.

The Beginning of Disintegration

If all of this is actually to take place, two things are important to Croatia, and we repeat them: the unconditioned return of those driven out and the refugees and creation of a police force on the principle of ethnic equality. Because this is explicitly set forth in Cyrus Vance' plan, which has been accepted by both sides, realization of the plan in the near future could also signify a process of liberating occupied Croatian territory by peaceful means.

To be sure, even during the stay of the "blue helmets," the "Krajina" will try to continue "life" in the towns and settlements, but when the Croatian population returns, it will be crisscrossed and fragmented, and that will actually be the beginning of its end, the beginning of disintegration of a terrorist paragovernmental creation that pretentiously thought it could be a state. Everything that will happen in the process of its disintegration will actually be parts of its dismantling and also of the legal punishment of the crimes and the people who played with the destiny of an entire people.

Data on Arms Smuggling by Croatia

92BA0679A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 16 Mar 92 p 7

[Article by Blagoje Komljenovic: "Missiles and Launching Ramps From Poland"]

[Text] The illegal importation and delivery of weapons to Croatia have been continuous since mid-1990, as a matter of fact since the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] came to power. Unfortunately, Tudjman's ZNG-ites [members of the National Guard Corps] and MUP-ites [members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs] are still being equipped. First, kalashnikovs and ammunition were smuggled from Hungary, then cannon, howitzers, and missiles arrived, recently more and more tanks have been coming, and now there are announcements of jet warplanes from Germany, where Croatian pilots are already being trained.

Two resolutions of the UN Security Council (713 and 724) on an embargo against any delivery of arms to Yugoslavia are not only not being respected by many countries, but they are even violating their own legislation more and more frequently. The imminent arrival of "blue helmets," one would say, is the last hope for permanent peace to prevail in this Balkan region.

But how, when, and from what state Croatia has been receiving arms is confirmed by the chronology whose publication we are concluding today.

24 January: A container of arms and military equipment weighing 17.5 tons was delivered to the port of Rijeka from the United States to meet the needs of the Croatian Defense Ministry.

29 January: Two shipments of arms and military equipment departed from Zurich for Croatia. The rail shipment, whose itinerary was Austria—Hungary—Croatia, contained six tanks manufactured in Germany, two Pinzgauer vehicles, and three ambulances. The highway shipment, whose itinerary was Zurich—Milan—Trieste—Rijeka, consisted of 23 vehicles (17 Barn and six Sauer).

Violation of the Import Embargo

Numerous other cases of the involvement of Croatian authorities for the purpose of obtaining arms and military equipment have also been recorded. But in August 1991, Croatian authorities opened several private firms in Zagreb (Promedei, owned by Ibrahim Dedic; Como; Ribomaterijal) intended for trade in arms and military equipment within the country and abroad. Through them, the purchase of a sizable quantity of armament and military equipment was contracted for (5,000 automatic pistols, 11,000 M-16 automatic rifles with six million rounds of ammunition, 1,300 RPG-7's with the necessary number of rounds, two and a half million kalashnikov automatic rifles with five million rounds, 7.62 mm, 60 surface-to-air Stinger missiles, two Cessna aircraft, and 500 uniforms with bulletproof vests and 500 tank crew uniforms).

After the embargo was placed against the importation of armament and military equipment into Yugoslavia, the Croatian authorities also undertook a broad drive to purchase weapons through foreign firms and dealers. We will cite certain typical examples. At the beginning of October 1991, the Croatian Defense Ministry paid $61 million into an account of the Austrian bank Die Erste Osterreichische Spar Case-Bank to purchase I-72 tanks. That same month, the Croatian Defense Ministry called upon the Austrian firm A.W.D.M. to obtain for it spare parts for T-55 tanks.

Through the Swiss firm Eram Ban Montage A.G. and the firm F.S. International Ltd. of Hong Kong, Croatia purchased 122 T-72 tanks worth $90 million. The money transaction went through the Austrian bank Rossler Bank AG in Vienna. The owner of these tanks is the USSR.

In Gdansk (Poland), Croatia purchased sizable quantities of armament and military equipment (16,500 kalashnikov automatic rifles, five million rounds of 7.62-mm ammunition, 175 RPG-7's, four million rounds, 150 MV-82's and 3,500 rounds, 120 MV-120's and 2,200 rounds, 7-mm PAM-12's [antiaircraft machine gun] and 9,000 rounds) for the amount of $12.5 million. The money transaction went through the Leibitz Bank and Banco Nacionale de Milano in Italy.

During November 1991, the Croatian Defense Ministry sought to purchase on the free market 300 T-72 tanks, 50,000 pistols, 30,000 automatic rifles, sizable quantities of PAP, PTR, PAR, and PAT 105- and 155-mm howitzers, 125-mm ammunition, 20,000 helmets, infrared binoculars, communications systems, etc. The Spanish dealer Dino Seferian made an offer.

On 2 December 1991, a sizable quantity of arms left Paris for Croatia. The organizers of this import transaction were Zeljko Suman and Tomislav Seruga, who are from Korcula and working temporarily in Nancy. The arms started out from Paris in the following vehicles: a Tarzan truck with German license plate No. 911-HAAN, a Mercedes truck with Yugoslav license plate No. ZG 365-49, a Volvo truck with French license plate No. 1964-KB-75, and a Scania trailer truck with French license plate No. 43-LD-93. The arms purchase was made through the firm PRO in Zagreb, and all the vehicles were registered in Greece.

Financing Furnished in Germany

Representatives of the Czechoslovak firm Trading SPOL visited Zagreb on 8 December 1991 for talks on deliveries of Czech weapons to Croatia.

During December 1991, several Polish vessels carrying arms for Croatia (300 tanks and 10,700 aerial bombs of various weights) were supposed to depart from Gdansk (Poland).

Helmut Weiser and Rita Draksler, German arms dealers, purchased a sizable quantity of arms on 19 December 1991 for the Croatian Defense Ministry (20,000 AKMS's with ammunition, 5,000 RPG-7's (launchers or mortars) with 20,000 shells, 10,000 Malyutka PTR's, 200 Strela CZ PAR's with 800 missiles, 1,000 RKM-D 7.62-mm light submachine guns with ammunition, and 100 82-mm mortars.

In late January 1992, Croatia contracted to purchase 250 Strela-2m missiles and 25 launchers, with consent of the

official Polish authorities. The Philippines were given as the purchaser, but the armament is intended for Croatia.

According to open sources and statements of representatives of the Croatian Defense Ministry, jet aircraft and systems for antiair defense will be purchased from certain European countries before the end of February.

Macedonia

Gligorov Denies Territory Claims

AU2503124792 Vienna ORF Television Network in German 2007 GMT 25 Mar 92

[Regina Strassegger report on interview with Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov; place and date not given—Gligorov statements in Macedonian with superimposed German translation]

[Excerpts] [Strassegger] Macedonians dream of a sovereign state, international solidarity, a better life, and, above all, peace in the Balkans. However, it is a long way from dreams to reality. But a beginning has been made that is quite remarkable in some respects. People rejoiced in the capital Skopje when an overwhelming majority of the 2.5 million Macedonians voted in favor of independence, that is for secession from Belgrade, in a referendum. The small republic headed by State President Kiro Gligorov is making efforts to win international recognition. The young republic of Macedonia already has its own anthem, which, however, will not become official before the recognition of the state. But Macedonia's image of itself does not depend on a date. It is this self-image that is a thorn in the side of the Greek neighbor. During recent mass protests in Saloniki people chanted: Macedonia is Greek, or the republic of Skopje has no right to call itself Macedonia. The rejoicing and the protests have a common basis: A suppressed past.

[Gligorov] Our new constitution is clear. We have no territorial claims, neither toward Bulgaria nor toward Greece. However, it is also clear that we will never give up our name. This is a problem for the Greeks because they suffer from a Macedonian trauma. It can only be solved through dialogue.

[Strassegger] In Skopje, which was largely destroyed by an earthquake in 1963, people have learned to overcome long hauls. Since Macedonia started its independence efforts, Greece has not only begun to threaten the republic but it has also adopted an economic boycott against the small state. This hurts Macedonia because its ailing economy urgently needs impulses from outside. President Gligorov commented on the impact of the blockade in the following way:

[Gligorov] The economic sanctions hit us hard, particularly as far as gasoline and diesel supply are concerned. People are lining up for hours and even days to obtain fuel. However, not only traffic is affected. The telecommunications system has been interrupted in certain areas. Transit and goods traffic are also involved. The behavior of the Greeks is in contradiction with the EC regulations on the free movement of goods. [passage omitted]

[Strassegger] Relations between Serbia and Macedonia had a colonial character in the past. Belgrade often described Macedonia as southern Serbia, which needs a protective power. The issue is more explosive today than ever before because a Serbian minority lives in Macedonia.

[Todorka Kozevska, worker from the Serbian minority] I only understand the whole talk about an independent Macedonia only in the sense that we stay within Yugoslavia. My husband is a Serb, my father died in the war for Yugoslavia. This is our home country. I am in favor of Macedonia receiving internal independence, but as part of the new Yugoslavia.

[Gligorov] We are familiar with this view. It comes from chauvinist circles where people still believe that the Serbian conquest that took place during World War II is still valid today. At the time nobody in Macedonia was asked whether we want this or not. It was fraternal help. President Milosevic assured us that Serbia respects the new status of the republic of Macedonia. One sign is that the federal Army withdrew, which would not have happened without Serbia's consent.

[Strassegger] Mr. President, is it true that you want to declare Macedonia as a demilitarized zone?

[Gligorov] After the withdrawal of the Army, we did not establish paramilitary units any more, we did not repair the barracks, and we naturally did everything possible to avoid conflicts with the Serbs. We saw in the most recent war that the Army cannot ensure peace. Quite the contrary. The population in the Balkans is mixed to such an extent that rigidly nationalist concepts are doomed to failure. We want to show that peaceful coexistence is possible in the Balkans as well. [passage omitted]

[Strassegger] Gligorov is not very popular among the Albanian minority in the country.

[Gligorov] Our policy toward the minorities is different from the Serbian policy in Kosovo. Since the elections, in which the minorities participated, we have been conducting an extensive dialogue. The minority won 23 seats in parliament, they hold the position of a vice president, and they have two ministers in the government. The Albanians must naturally be loyal to the state. If they want to establish their own states, they will face problems. [passage omitted]

Statement Issued on Gligorov-Rugova Talks

AU2603084892 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 20 Mar 92 p 6

[D.N. report: "'Wordless' Announcement"]

[Text] Skopje—The Cabinet of the President of Macedonia has not refuted SKENDIA, which, according to TANJUG, reported that during the talks between Ibrahim Rugova, who led the delegation of the Kosovo Alliance, and Kiro Gligorov, President of Macedonia, it was said that Kosovo and Macedonia were "two units of ex-Yugoslavia," that "Kosovo was occupied," and that "everyone should learn from the politics that Albanians promote."

Instead of a refutation, the Cabinet issued only a statement that made no mention of any of the things that TANJUG claims SKENDIA published. Gligorov's statement says that during that meeting he spoke of the peaceful and constructive politics that Macedonia conducted in the region, particularly in promoting friendly relations and cooperation with its neighbors. The statement put the emphasis on the fact that Macedonia would not establish special ties with any of its neighbors. Its orientation was European and democratic, and for that reason Macedonia favored a Balkan region with open borders, and the free movement of people, goods, and capital among all Balkan states. As for interethnic relations, the statement says that these would be developed on the basis of the civil Macedonian Constitution, and would follow the principles of equality and tolerance.

The Skopje weekly PULS states that "this is not good enough as an interpretation of the Albanian delegation's visit," and "it could make relations between Skopje and Belgrade even cooler, because, after all, Kosovo is Serbia's internal affair, and that is where it should be solved." The reporter from BORBA could not find out why Gligorov did not refute Rugova's version of the talks, choosing instead to make an indirect refutation through the statement. The talks between Gligorov and Rugova were held on 14 March in Skopje.

Serbia

Foreign Minister Jovanovic Leaves for Washington

LD2603112792 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1046 GMT 26 mar 92

[Text] Belgrade, Mar 26 (TANJUG)—Serbian Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic today left on a two-day visit to Washington. During his stay in the U.S. capital, Jovanovic will meet with representatives of the U.S. Administration, the State Department and the Congress.

U.S. Ties Anniversary Celebrated

LD2503112192 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1948 GMT 23 Mar 92

[Text] Belgrde, Mar 23 (TANJUG)—The celebration of the 110th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Serbia and the United States is an occasion for making a scientific evaluation of the current relations between the two countries, it was heard at the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) on Monday. The SANU will mark the anniversary by organizing a symposium on March 25, in which prominent Serbian and U.S. experts are expected to participate. The allegation voiced at the symposium "Law in the shadow of politics," held at the SANU last January, that there are no major differences in stands between the United States and the European Community in view of the settlement of the Yugoslav crisis has proved true, journalists were told.

Academician Kosta Mihajlovic pointed out that this has proved true in the meantime and that a turnabout in the U.S. policy towards Yugoslavia can be perceived. Some SANU members warned that the question of succession in Yugoslavia was crucial and recalled that the Yugoslav breakaway republics of Slovenia and Croatia had requested the E.C. to declare Yugoslavia non-existant, in which case they would also be legitimate successors of the former state. On March 9, the U.S. and the E.C. agreed to coordinate their stands and activities in settling the Yugoslav crisis.